Between Law And Reality: Why Recalling A Nigerian Lawmaker Is Practically Impossible
In thriving democracies, the power to recall an elected representative is more than a legal provision—it’s a democratic safeguard. It allows citizens to hold their leaders accountable between elections and to remove those who betray public trust, fail in performance, or become ethically compromised.
Recall processes are not unique to Nigeria. In fact, they are alive and well in several advanced democracies. In the United States, for instance, over 150 recall elections were held in 2011 alone. Of these, 75 public officials were removed from office, and nine others resigned in the face of imminent removal. Other examples can be found in Japan, Ecuador, and Peru, where citizens have successfully wielded the recall power to keep public servants in check.
These examples show that recall can serve as a functional and practical democratic tool when the legal, institutional, and political environment allows it. In principle, Nigeria recognizes this democratic tool. In practice, however, it is a constitutional right trapped in a labyrinth of impossible demands.
On Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan
The ongoing attempt to recall Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan has reignited my interest in discussing the disconnect between the constitutional right to recall and the practical realities of executing it in Nigeria.
Before dissecting the issue, let’s be clear: I stand firmly against the recall effort aimed at Senator Akpoti-Uduaghan. The political undertones are palpable, the timing suspect, and the implications deeply troubling. If a senator, a powerful voice in her own right, can be so aggressively targeted, what hope is there for the vulnerable, the marginalized? What message does it send to a 15-year-old sexual abuse victim seeking justice? The spectacle surrounding her suspension, the allegations, and the rush to punitive action before due process reeks of political theatre, not democratic accountability. It also reflects how politics can be weaponized against women and dissenting voices.
The Graveyard of Recalls: A History of Futility
Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan’s case is far from the first. Every attempt to recall a Nigerian legislator has ended the same way: in failure. The reasons are systemic.
- George Ike Okoye, representing Njikoka II in Anambra State, survived an early recall attempt.
- Simon Lalong, then Speaker of the Plateau State House of Assembly, faced a failed recall when the referendum could not muster the required voter turnout.
- Farouk Adamu of Jigawa came the closest. Despite 61,117 constituents voting for his recall, it fell short of the constitutional requirement.
- Dino Melaye of Kogi State, whose recall process gained national attention, ultimately completed his term despite political pushback.
These repeated failures suggest something far more profound than public apathy—they point to a structural design that sets the recall process up to fail.
How the Constitution Frames the Process
Sections 69 and 110 of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitution and section 116 of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) outline the procedure for recalling a member of the National Assembly, State House of Assembly, or the Area Council of the FCT. It includes:
- A petition signed by more than half of the registered voters in the constituency.
- Verification of the petition by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).
- A referendum must then be held, in which at least 50% plus one of the registered voters must vote “yes” to effect the recall.
On paper, this sounds like democracy at work. In reality, it is an impossible mountain to climb.
Why the Process is Practically Unachievable
One of the major obstacles is the sheer scale and cost of organizing a recall. From mobilizing staff and materials to running the referendum and subsequent bye-election, the resources required are comparable to those of the main election. However, beyond logistics lies a more technical problem: the flawed state of Nigeria’s voter register.
Voter Turnout and Register Discrepancies: Since 2023, voter turnout has consistently declined. Consider the following figures:
- 1999 – 52.3%
- 2003 – 69.1%
- 2007 – 57.5%
- 2011 – 53.7%
- 2015 – 43.7%
- 2019 – 34.8%
- 2023 – 29.1%
This downward trend is often attributed to voter apathy. Yes, it could be. But what if that is not the complete picture? What if the issue is less about public disinterest and more about a bloated, outdated voter register? What if the register, bloated with the names of the deceased and the relocated, paints a false picture of participation?
Nigeria’s current voter register—first re-developed in 2010 ahead of the 2011 elections—has not been adequately updated to reflect deaths and relocations. As a result, the number of registered voters continues to rise on paper, even though the actual number of active or accessible voters is shrinking. While millions of new voters have been added, deceased voters and those who have relocated remain on the roll, artificially inflating the number of registered voters and skewing turnout data.
With this in mind, let us break the recall process down with a hypothetical example:
- A constituency has 200,000 registered voters.
- Assume 30% (a conservative estimate) are either dead or relocated: that leaves 140,000 potentially active voters.
- To trigger a recall, the Constitution requires 100,001 signatures.
- Even if every living, willing, and available voter participates, over 71% of the 140,000 must support the recall.
In a country where turnout rarely exceeds 35%, that is a statistical impossibility.
Flawed Clean-Up Processes
While INEC uses biometric systems like ABIS (Automated Biometric Identification System) to clean up new registrations, the legacy database remains largely untouched. Before the 2023 elections, INEC sieved out 2.78 million ineligible new registrants and thereby added only 9.5 million valid ones to an already questionable base of 84 million—pushing the total to over 93 million.
This trend will likely continue into 2027, compounding the problem.
Charting a Way Forward
If we are serious about accountability, democratic participation, and electoral justice, several urgent reforms must take place:
1. Comprehensive Voter Register Audit: INEC must collaborate with the National Population Commission and relevant agencies to ensure a scientifically updated register that reflects real, living, and accessible voters.
2. Establish a Functional Death Register: Just like birth registration has seen recent improvement, there must be equal attention to tracking and recording deaths for national planning and electoral integrity.
3. Ease of Voter Transfer: Nigerians who move should be able to update their voter details to reflect their new locations easily. This is not just a matter of convenience—it is a matter of enfranchisement.
4. Revisit the Recall Threshold: The constitutional thresholds for initiating and approving recalls should be re-examined in light of Nigeria’s electoral participation realities. Perhaps a threshold based on voter turnout rather than registered voters would make the process more reflective of democratic engagement.
5. Civic Education and Political Literacy: The recall process must be demystified and de-politicized. Citizens need to understand its purpose, limitations, and potential as a democratic safeguard—not as a tool for political vendetta.
Until Nigeria confronts the structural contradictions in its electoral system—particularly around its voter register and civic participation—the recall process will remain a theoretical right, theatrical endeavour, and impossible to exercise in practice. The case of Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan will merely further underscore this larger dysfunction. If we are genuinely committed to deepening our democracy, then the right to recall must not only exist on paper but be made real, practical, easy to activate, and reflective of the people’s will.
Kingsley Oladayo OGUNNE, PhD Writes from Ile-Ife. Can be reached via: 08088444325 or [email protected]