What To Expect At The NATO Summit

As NATO prepares for its 2026 summit, European members’ immediate concerns centre less on what to do about Ukraine than on whether the U.S. president might spoil the intended show of unity. In this Q&A, Crisis Group expert Olga Oliker previews the alliance’s annual gathering.

What is unusual about the 2026 NATO summit? On 7-8 July, when NATO member state leaders meet in Ankara for the alliance’s 2026 summit, they will be keen to project calm and continuity at a turbulent moment in transatlantic relations. To that end, much of the proceedings will be reminiscent of their recent annual gatherings. They are expected to announce progress on European members’ spending commitments and defence industrial ramp-ups that will increase these states’ share of responsibility for the continent’s security. Türkiye, like many past hosts, will be keen to underline its strategic importance and showcase its defence industry to its allies. Many allies also hope to announce plans for continued aid to Ukraine, now in its fifth year of war resisting Russia’s all-out invasion.

But the summit participants will be on tenterhooks nevertheless, with many allies worried that all this business could be derailed by U.S. President Donald Trump. Trump has lately stepped up his longstanding criticism of NATO allies, lambasting them for what he views as their inadequate support for Washington in its war of choice, alongside Israel, with Iran. His broadsides come on top of announcements that Washington will soon withdraw more U.S. troops and weapons from Europe. Not for the first time, Trump has been speculating about pulling the United States out of NATO entirely.

For most NATO members, the alliance today is a balancing act.

For most NATO members, the alliance today is a balancing act. Convinced by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that Moscow poses a real threat to their security, most are united in wanting to support Kyiv, deter any further malign behaviour on Russia’s part and bolster the role that European states play in the alliance, thus reducing its reliance on the U.S. The last of these goals reflects not the dangers from outside NATO, but Trump’s repeated statements that he questions the alliance’s value. As Trump cuts back the U.S. assets devoted to NATO, he demands that other member states do more. Trump has also shut off what had been a huge pipeline of U.S. aid to Ukraine, forcing other allies to expend substantial funds and other resources to rapidly make up the difference (including with a 90 billion euro loan to Kyiv from the European Union, which began disbursements on 29 June). Finally, and most importantly, the U.S. president has repeatedly cast doubt on whether the U.S. would come to allies’ aid if things in Europe were to go awry. He seems to be chipping away at the U.S. commitment to the alliance’s cornerstone: the mutual defence pledge in Article 5 of NATO’s constitutive treaty.

But filling the gap that the U.S. would leave is a tall order, as replacing what the U.S. brings to the table will take time, new strategies and a good deal of money. Thus, since Trump retook the oath of office in January 2025, other allies have striven to increase their autonomous ability to meet defence needs, while also trying to keep Washington engaged for as long as possible. Among other things, they have had to continually calibrate when to stand up to Trump and when to appease him.

What are NATO summits for? Historically, NATO summits have served as platforms for announcing policy shifts, formally welcoming new members and otherwise developing alliance strategy for signalling to the world. They culminate in summit statements laying out agreed-upon positions. While the meetings themselves are for members only, leaders from non-NATO states or institutions (such as the EU) are often invited for the attendant ceremonies as well as side discussions. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been invited to the Ankara summit and is expected to attend. Other invitees include the leaders of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

In the past, summits occurred on an as-needed basis; only recently have they become annual. Months after the alliance’s June 2021 gathering in Brussels, Russia launched its all-out invasion of Ukraine, leading to two extraordinary summits in 2022, one virtual, in February, and one in Brussels, in March, to discuss the rapidly evolving conflict and its implications for the alliance. Members agreed to support Ukraine and adjust NATO’s military positioning in light of what was widely seen as a war of aggression. That summer, the alliance held another summit, in Madrid, to declare Russia “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”; adopt, accordingly, a new strategic posture; invite Sweden and Finland to join NATO; and reaffirm a variety of past commitments, including to increase defence spending.

In the years thereafter, NATO members built on the Madrid framework. In 2023, they unveiled new defence plans. They welcomed Finland and Sweden as allies in 2023 and 2024, respectively. NATO members have also committed to higher defence expenditures, culminating in a 2025 promise that each will spend at least 3.5 per cent of GDP on the military and 1.5 per cent on critical infrastructure by 2035. Summit “communiqués” or “declarations” reiterated that alliance members view Russia as a threat and affirmed support for Ukraine as it continues to fight Moscow’s invading army, most decisively including a long-term pledge of such aid in 2024. Except for the one issued in 2025, just after Trump entered office, summit outputs since February 2022 have also consistently condemned Russia for the invasion.

The Ankara summit, if it goes smoothly, will be more about reporting progress than any new strategic direction. That may make for a relatively staid meeting, but member state officials see value in annual gatherings even if their frequency means there is often less news to announce. In particular, regular meetings may provide a useful incentive to live up to commitments, which is especially important at a transformative moment for the alliance. But with Trump in the White House, regular summits also present the risk of embarrassing spectacles that throw the divides between the U.S. and the rest of NATO into sharp relief.

What does the Trump administration have against NATO?

Trump began casting aspersions on NATO during his first presidency, griping that European alliance members were not “paying their bills”. In fact, every NATO member pays individually for its own defence; it is not charged by the alliance for services rendered. But the spirit of his complaint echoed frustrations vented for decades by U.S. officials and a number of European ones as well.

Vexing as it may be, the model by which the U.S. provides the bulk of the military forces and capabilities for the alliance has always been part of NATO’s design. In exchange for its troops and weapons, Washington has enjoyed uncontested leadership of a powerful alliance encompassing much of the European continent; more than generous basing agreements and arrangements across and beyond Europe; and allies’ political support on a variety of foreign policy issues. Its allies have received security, which the U.S., having fought in Europe during two world wars, has seen as integral to its own.

Trump ... remains unconvinced that the alliance offers enough bang for the buck.

Trump, however, remains unconvinced that the alliance offers enough bang for the buck. His attitude stems, in part, from scepticism about the long-accepted view that European security is critical to U.S. security. Nor does he believe, as his predecessors as U.S. president did, that countries on the two sides of the Atlantic are bound together by common values. He rejects the often progressive politics of allied European governments, worries that they will entangle the U.S. in conflicts not central to its interests and resents them for getting in the way of the relationship he would like to cultivate with Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

In this vein, he shocked European leaders with his efforts in early 2025 to normalise relations with Moscow, in part through his unconventional diplomatic overtures to end its war in Ukraine. Not only did this policy reverse President Joe Biden’s staunch backing for Kyiv, but it also flew in the face of the transatlantic consensus since 2022 that Moscow’s war in Ukraine presaged grave dangers to European stability and security that were of consequence to Washington. Alarmed European capitals pointed to the Kremlin’s desire to see its own military grow while demanding that NATO capabilities in Europe shrink, as well as to its political, economic and covert efforts to do harm to NATO and EU members. Trump appeared unmoved.

Yet the Trump administration expects and demands still greater deference than the U.S. has previously commanded in the alliance – even as his unilateral diplomacy and coercive threats have sometimes made it impossible to fully follow Washington’s lead on foreign policy issues. Allies had little option but to push back, for example, on a proposed deal between Washington and Moscow that, among other things, would seemingly have lifted EU, as well as U.S., sanctions on Russia. To Trump’s frustration, non-U.S. members of the alliance also banded together to resist his effort to pry Greenland away from NATO member state Denmark, including with military preparations. Most recently, the U.S. president has been furious with European allies about what he and his administration see as insufficient rhetorical and material support for the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran.

Trump’s policy response to his view that NATO and European allies are of little value to the U.S. has been to periodically threaten to withdraw the U.S. from the alliance, a prospect he raised in his first term, and to announce at the start of his second that he would carry out a global posture review, expected to result in drastically reduced military commitments to the continent. On both these points, the U.S. Congress has sought to tie the president’s hands. In 2024, it directed any president to consult both chambers of Congress and gain approval from the Senate before taking steps to leave the alliance. In 2025, it passed legislation that makes it very difficult to reduce force levels in Europe below 76,000 troops, requiring certification, a report, consultations with allies and a waiting period. Yet the administration continues to drop hints about exiting the alliance. In April, for example, National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the U.S. could re-examine its relationship with NATO after the war with Iran ends.

Confusing the picture yet further, Washington continues to make noises about pulling U.S. forces out of Europe, though it has fallen silent in regards to the global posture review to which it committed earlier. Initial plans for force reductions were seemingly flummoxed when U.S. officials began seriously weighing the high costs and damaging effects this action would have upon U.S. global operations. Still, related conversations continue. For example, the administration has issued a series of announcements that might be linked to reported internal discussions about redeploying forces from countries the U.S. has deemed less helpful to its war with Iran to others it has deemed more helpful.

Even here it is hard to discern what is happening. Washington called off rotational deployments of U.S. forces to Poland, only, soon afterward and amid talk of Poland hosting a new U.S. base, to pledge even more troops to that country. It has said it would withdraw troops from Germany, reversing a plan to emplace a long-range strike battalion armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles and other capabilities. It has told allies that it intends to shrink its commitment of aircraft and warships to the alliance, a move that would significantly degrade NATO’s capabilities and force a substantial recalibration of operational plans. Most recently, on 18 June, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced a six-month review of the U.S. military presence in Europe at a meeting of NATO defence ministers meant to prepare for July’s summit.

Ironically, and for all its declared frustration, Washington’s relationships with European allies have been critical to its war with Iran.

Ironically, and for all its declared frustration, Washington’s relationships with European allies have been critical to its war with Iran. The war, which many European governments opposed and likely saw as violating UN Charter prohibitions on the use of aggressive force, presented a major diplomatic conundrum. Other NATO members were wary of alienating Trump but did not see the conflict as triggering alliance commitments (which relate to defensive, not offensive action). They thought the war misguided at best, and accordingly, they were reluctant to support it by allowing bases on their territory to be used. Still, though Spain has refused to provide base access in opposition to the war, other countries have done so, generally in line with their bilateral commitments to the U.S. They have also allowed U.S. ships and aircraft to use their facilities for repairs and refuelling. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the U.S. would have prosecuted its Iran campaign, or how it could carry out most Middle East operations, without resort to European allies’ assistance and bases.

But Trump continues to complain that allies’ behaviour has been insufficiently “loyal”. While Washington’s demands have abated somewhat since it agreed to a ceasefire with Tehran on 18 June, Trump and his team remain irked that their European counterparts generally failed to evince more enthusiasm for the war, declined to send ships to open sea lanes amid active hostilities (an effort that would be a poor fit for most available European capabilities) and, fundamentally, made clear that they were not eager to join the U.S. in its fight.

What role is host Türkiye playing? Trump’s disagreements with European member states are only one storyline at the forthcoming NATO summit. Host Türkiye has its own agenda, one that Ankara hopes will be central.

Ankara, like other allies on the European continent, sees the alliance as integral to its security. Turkish officials will be eager to underscore both what they bring to the enterprise and what more they could contribute. While Ankara has not been in lockstep with European neighbours as concerns relations with Moscow (eg, they have not joined allies in imposing sanctions on Russia and maintain economic and political ties with it) they share other NATO members’ view that a Russian victory over its neighbour would be detrimental to Europe as a whole.

Ankara’s assets include not only its armed forces, NATO’s second largest after the U.S. military, but also its role in providing security for eastern Europe and points south. Its strategic position on the Black Sea has been of enormous importance in the Russia-Ukraine war, where it has prevented Moscow from reinforcing the Russian Black Sea fleet. It did so by invoking Article 19 of the 1936 Montreux Convention, closing the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to the warships of the belligerent parties, with the exception of vessels returning to their home bases. This action, in turn, helped Ukraine succeed in significantly degrading Russia’s Black Sea fleet – including, reportedly, by forcing most of its command to move from Crimea to Novorossiisk on the Russian mainland coast.

Ankara’s value proposition to its allies, by its lights, ... includes its defence industrial capacity, which has grown tremendously over the last decade.

Ankara’s value proposition to its allies, by its lights, also includes its defence industrial capacity, which has grown tremendously over the last decade, even as many of its allies are only now starting to ramp up production. The growing EU role in funding defence means that most allies, which are also EU members, will be working with the bloc as they spend their defence euros. Because Türkiye is not a member and a clear thread in EU spending policy is to buy from within the bloc, Turkish firms – and officials in Ankara – fear that they will be left out. To be sure, Türkiye’s defence manufacturers are already cooperating closely with a number of partners across the continent, but with widespread predictions of more growth, Ankara believes it can play an even bigger role. To this end, Ankara is hosting a Defence Industry Forum concurrent with the summit, and it expects high attendance from allied government personnel and industry representatives. Its plans neatly align with other allies’ and NATO officials’ desire to showcase and promote defence industry at the summit.

Ankara is also keen to highlight its bilateral ties with Washington and the warm relationship between Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Trump. Indeed, Trump has said he is attending the summit because Erdoğan is hosting it and requested his presence. In the lead-up to the summit, Erdogan has indicated that he expects the two men to hold talks, and Trump has hinted that the U.S. might clear the way to sell not only jet engines, but also F-35 fighters to Türkiye, though approvals for both face substantial Congressional opposition. (F-35 purchases were blocked by the first Trump administration due to Ankara’s acquisition of Russian S-400 air defence missiles.)

But most of all, like other NATO allies, Ankara wants a successful summit. Signs of disunity among the allies would undermine Türkiye’s interests on all fronts, potentially harming defence industrial cooperation prospects and weakening its case for the country’s critical importance to NATO. With NATO remaining a pillar of Turkish security, Ankara, like its European allies and Canada, needs the alliance to remain strong.

How are European allies and Canada looking to ensure a smooth summit?

There is no way to reliably manage Trump and prevent him from disrupting the summit, but there are tactics that have worked well in the past. One is to underscore the transformative impact Trump has on burden shifting. At the 2025 summit, held at The Hague months after the start of Trump’s second term, alliance members emphasised their commitment to higher defence spending. The pledge to spend 3.5 per cent of GDP directly on defence and 1.5 per cent on defence-related and critical infrastructure was seen as a way to demonstrate to the U.S. president that his remonstrations had succeeded, and NATO was, indeed, on the way to being an alliance where every member paid its way.

Today, allies are determined to strengthen this message. They wish to prove not only that they are paying their way, but that NATO remains a strong value proposition for the U.S. So, they are pointing to the progress to date. Allies’ spending is certainly up – as of 2025, all have met or exceeded the previous target of 2 per cent of GDP spent on defence, and European allies and Canada were, as a whole, up 20 per cent in their spending compared to the previous year. In the coming years, senior military leaders from European member states will command NATO’s three Joint Force commands, two of them taking over from U.S. counterparts. A U.S. officer will lead each of NATO’s three theatre component commands (U.S. personnel had led two of them previously) and retain the role of Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Europeans can also laud progress in defence manufacturing – aside from noting the Defence Industry Forum, they are expected to announce substantial new armaments deals with manufacturers.

Of course, these successes belie continued challenges – spending does not translate into capability by itself, and European leaders and manufacturers, like those elsewhere, are struggling to define the best way forward in a world where fast, cheap and adaptable weapons have proven themselves in Ukraine and Iran, even as specific highly technical capabilities, such as advanced air defences, are needed in larger numbers and much faster than industry seems structured to produce them.

Defining truly European approaches will take time, and it may require comprehensive rethinking of what threats Russia truly poses ... and just what is needed to deter them.

Furthermore, substituting European and Canadian capabilities for U.S. assets cannot be a matter of one-for-one replacement, which would incur tremendous expense and is likely impracticable in Europe’s very different social, economic and political environment. Different strategies are needed but have yet to emerge. Defining truly European approaches will take time, and it may require comprehensive rethinking of what threats Russia truly poses (particularly as the Kremlin, too, reassesses its strategy in light of the war in Ukraine) and just what is needed to deter them. In the meantime, even as it encourages allies to do more, the U.S. appears determined to hold on to key aspects of leadership (for now with European assent, to be sure) such as the Supreme Allied Commander chair.

A second facet of the Trump management strategy has been a series of visits and engagements by allied leaders to press NATO’s case for itself and encourage bonhomie, including at the G7 meeting in mid-June, which was followed by a lavish reception hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron at Versailles. On 24 June, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte visited Washington to brief Trump on just how much allies have, in fact, done to support the U.S. war with Iran, as well as their progress on spending, crediting the latter to the president’s efforts. He also argued that European defence spending creates jobs in the U.S., supporting the employment of 195,000 people in the country.

Thirdly, the summit’s brevity may also be part of an effort to limit the risk of disruption (and is consistent with a relatively thin agenda). There will be only a single session, though there will be a variety of meals and side events. A draft of the summit statement appears to indicate that allies are looking to keep that text short, too, as they did in 2025, and to avoid things that might upset the U.S. president. Per those same reports, they intend to include, alongside pledges to buy more weapons, language on Iran – underlining that it should not develop nuclear weapons and that it should uphold freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Further, the draft apparently reiterates past wording characterising Russia as a threat to the alliance and underscoring NATO’s mutual defence clause. Rutte has also affirmed that NATO will again pledge continued aid to Ukraine.

Diplomats have speculated that the U.S. president may be collegial in Ankara, so as not to offend his host, President Erdoğan. But in the end, even if Trump says things that discomfit or irritate U.S. allies, it is more important that over time they more closely align themselves in finding a new way forward for the alliance – one that enables them to assure their security, including by deterring Russian aggression, even if they cannot rely on the U.S. For the moment, their approach of trying to keep the U.S. on board while other allies build up capabilities, and continuing to support Ukraine, appears to be working. Much as the administration seems erratic and prickly toward its European allies – pulled in different directions by military, political and cultural considerations – it seems interested in maintaining a leadership role even as it reduces commitments. This posture is likely to serve allies’ interests in the near term, by maintaining U.S. involvement. Over the longer term, however, a new approach will be needed, as allies genuinely seek autonomy from a U.S. that is not always dependable or aligned with their interests.