The DR Congo-Rwanda Deal: Now Comes The Hard Part
A new peace agreement offers hope of quelling hostilities between Kinshasa and Kigali in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. In this Q&A, Crisis Group expert Richard Moncrieff assesses the tough road ahead as diplomats seek to ensure that the belligerents quiet their guns.
What’s new?
Foreign ministers from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda signed a peace agreement at the White House on 27 June. The deal aims to tamp down fighting that has killed thousands and driven hundreds of thousands from their homes in the eastern DRC. Since the beginning of the year, M23 rebels backed by Rwandan troops have expelled the Congolese army and state authorities from much of North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, taking swathes of territory there. The new accord requires Rwanda and the DRC to cease hostilities, respect each other’s territorial integrity and halt support for non-state armed groups. The text also mentions plans for trade in Congolese minerals backed up by possible U.S. investment, as discussed below. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that the parties would hold a presidential summit in the coming months, again in Washington. A parallel track involving direct talks between Kinshasa and the M23 is under way in the Qatari capital Doha. U.S. President Donald Trump, who presided over the White House signing ceremony, billed the deal as a “glorious triumph”, while others, including the African Union (AU), the UN, Russia and France, also welcomed it.
Despite the optimism in Washington and the prospect of a presidential summit, it will be arduous diplomatic work to make this deal stick. Previous agreements have been scuppered by foot dragging and disputes over sequencing of steps, and signs are it could happen again. One such sign is that fighting continues on the ground, the agreement notwithstanding. The M23, a Tutsi-led insurgency named after a failed 23 March 2009 peace deal between its predecessor rebel group and Kinshasa, has previously stated that it is not bound by any deal Rwanda might make with the DRC, even though it is backed by Kigali. While the M23’s expansion into new territory has slowed since March, amid mediation efforts, the rebels are still engaged in hostilities with a loose, mostly pro-Kinshasa coalition of armed groups that are together known as the Wazalendo (Swahili for patriot). With the ink barely dry in Washington, the M23 pressed its advance toward Uvira, the last major city in South Kivu that remains under government control. Rwandan troops, who numbered around 6,000 in the DRC at the start of the year and bear hi-tech weaponry that has been vital to the rebel conquests, continue to give the M23 critical support.
Meanwhile, the Congolese army is attempting to regroup, while the defence ministry buys new hardware, including attack drones. Kinshasa’s soldiers are skirmishing with rebel fighters at the edges of M23-held areas. On 1 July, three days after the truce, the Congolese army shot down a plane as it approached the Kiziba airstrip in South Kivu, which is in rebel hands. The M23 responded angrily, saying the plane was carrying humanitarian supplies. Government forces have not, however, attempted to launch a counteroffensive to retake positions the M23 has overrun.
Why is there war in the eastern DRC?
The U.S.-Qatari initiative to mediate between Rwanda and the DRC emerged after three and a half years of war, which itself followed three decades of on-and-off fighting in the region . Conflict started in the 1990s as refugees from Rwanda, with a number of perpetrators of the genocide against Rwandan Tutsis hiding among them, flowed into the eastern DRC in 1994. Rwanda sent in troops to track down these perpetrators, who later coalesced into the Rwandan Democratic Liberation Front (FDLR, by the French acronym). Other countries got involved, notably Uganda, and looting the DRC’s rich mineral and agricultural resources became a key driver of outside intervention. Amid the chaos, non-state armed groups proliferated, creating a melee of predatory militias. These came to include the M23, which took over Goma, the largest city in North Kivu, briefly in 2012 before being pushed back to refugee camps in Rwanda and Uganda the next year. A 2013 peace agreement between the DRC and M23 brought hostilities between the two parties to a formal end.
In November 2021, however, the M23 re-emerged after eight years of dormancy and began seizing ever larger and more heavily populated areas of the DRC’s east. Evidence from UN experts and Crisis Group sources suggests that Rwanda has backed the group since late 2021. The reasons are manifold, but the primary trigger for Rwanda’s intervention appears to date back to 2021, when the Congolese government invited Rwanda’s regional rivals Uganda and Burundi to deploy troops to its eastern Kivu provinces. Kinshasa hoped that the DRC’s neighbours would help it quash the Allied Democratic Forces, a Ugandan Islamist group that has wreaked havoc in parts of eastern Congo. DRC authorities also encouraged Uganda to extend trading networks in the region .
Rwanda, which seeks access to the mineral wealth that lies in adjacent parts of the DRC and keeps proxies in place to tamp down any threat to its regime, almost certainly reactivated the M23 to counter these competitors’ expansion into what it saw as its turf. At first, the M23’s rhetoric focused on the plight of Congolese Tutsis, who have generally been neglected by Kinshasa. But in late 2023, its new political branch, the Congo River Alliance (AFC in French) claimed it was fighting to overthrow the government in Kinshasa, upping the stakes in the growing conflict.
How did mediation efforts gain traction?
The current diplomatic initiative was preceded by an Angolan effort that started in 2022. At that time, Luanda began hosting AU-mandated talks between the DRC and Rwanda (without M23 participation). These failed to halt hostilities, not least because the rebels and their Rwandan supporters were doing well on the battlefield and saw little need to make concessions. Talks under Angolan auspices were further muddied by disputes over the agenda and sequencing. Kinshasa demanded that Rwandan troops leave Congolese territory without conditions. Kigali demurred, pointing to Kinshasa’s collaboration with hostile armed groups based in the DRC, notably the FDLR. Personal antagonism between the DRC’s President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame hardly helped. Nor did the barbed words exchanged by other Congolese and Rwandan officials on social media.
For a while, diplomacy seemed stuck, but a new track emerged after fighting intensified in early 2025, culminating in the M23’s capture of Goma on 27 January. Qatar, which has considerable influence over both parties flowing from investments in the region (notably in Kigali’s new international airport), invited Presidents Tshisekedi and Kagame to meet in Doha in March. It managed to get the Congolese and Rwandan presidents to sign an in-principle agreement to cease hostilities. In close consultation with Doha, the Trump administration joined these efforts, working to flesh out the March deal. Massad Boulos, Trump’s U.S. special envoy to Africa, travelled to the Great Lakes region shortly after his appointment in April. Talks continued in Washington in the run-up to the 27 June deal.
Though the [U.S.] administration has otherwise shown scant interest in the continent ... the Great Lakes region appears to have caught its eye.
Though the administration has otherwise shown scant interest in the continent (many senior posts in the State Department’s Africa bureau remain unfilled), the Great Lakes region appears to have caught its eye. Diplomats no doubt saw a chance to cast the U.S. as closing a deal that could be classed as a “win” for President Trump, who portrays himself as a peacemaker. In addition, Washington continues to covet access to the vast mineral reserves underneath Congolese soil. The 27 June agreement includes a short line calling for Rwanda and DRC to cooperate in the minerals trade, “in partnership, as appropriate, with the U.S. government and U.S. investors”. The idea, according to mediators contacted by Crisis Group, is to encourage licit commerce that all can benefit from, including Rwanda.
Though the Washington agreement mentioned commercial interests in a low-key way (as compared to the preparatory Statement of Principles , where they were more prominent), their mention in a peace deal has been controversial in the DRC. Congolese are particularly sensitive to any prospect of the country’s mineral wealth being extracted outside their control. They are angry that, for several years, the M23 has been sending shipments of minerals out through Rwanda to international processing chains with no legal authority and at no benefit to the Congolese treasury.
How are the M23-DRC talks in Doha progressing?
After initiating the present round of Great Lakes diplomacy, Qatar turned its attention to negotiations between the M23 and Kinshasa, the first such direct talks since 2022. Progress has been slow, as the sides have squabbled over procedural issues and the M23 has complained that the Congolese delegation is not empowered to make major decisions. The sluggish pace is hardly surprising, as authorities in Kinshasa are reluctant to discuss terms with what they see as a Rwandan proxy, one that, through its AFC branch, has embraced a program of regime change. Nevertheless, talks are continuing, and may be helped by the deal struck in Washington, given that Kigali will likely have to greenlight any significant concession made by the M23 delegates.
How have the parties to the conflict reacted?
Overall, Rwandan negotiators are happier with the deal than their Congolese counterparts, though Kigali is not rushing to put it into practice. In response to the signing, Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe welcomed the agreement and stated that the first priority should be “neutralisation” of the FDLR (meaning killing or capturing its cadres). Only then, he said, would Rwanda lift its own “defensive measures” in the DRC – a Rwandan euphemism for deploying troops in support of the M23 that is echoed in the agreement’s language. Congolese authorities and many observers view this demand as pretextual, since the M23 and Rwandan troops have extended their campaign far beyond the FDLR’s areas of influence. The condition also fails to take into account the reality that M23 now controls many of the areas where the FDLR is active – making it difficult for Kinshasa to even try to clear out the FDLR unless the M23 units withdraw first. Great Lakes watchers see the condition as a dilatory tactic and suggest that Kigali is determined to spool out its military deployment as long as possible. Sources with knowledge of the negotiations told Crisis Group that U.S. mediators pushed hard for full Rwandan troop withdrawal prior to signing the 27 June deal but yielded in the face of determined resistance from Kigali. A soon-to-be-released UN report indicates Rwanda has downsized the garrison since reinforcing it in January, but underlines that it remains strong.
In the DRC, reactions to the [peace] agreement are mixed. Some government officials have welcomed it ... But other reactions have been more critical.
In the DRC, reactions to the agreement are mixed. Some government officials have welcomed it, including President Tshisekedi in his independence day speech on 30 June, and several opposition figures have as well. But other reactions have been more critical . Alongside the unease about the place of minerals in a peace agreement, the objections centre on three key points. The failure to mandate the immediate withdrawal of Rwandan troops rankles, particularly in light of the heavy focus on Kinshasa taking measures against the FDLR, which DRC officials see as a pretext for delay. (By contrast, UN Security Council Resolution 2773, adopted on 21 February, makes the call for a Rwandan withdrawal explicit.) Critics of the deal also argue that the agreement should spell out the consequences that Kigali would face should it fail to comply, suggesting that in their absence there is too little to hold the deal together.
Finally, as concerns the rebels, the M23 and its political wing the AFC are blowing hot and cold. Some rebel officials have said they have no interest in an agreement signed between two states and are bound only by what might emerge from their own negotiations with the Congolese government in Doha. While some of its cadres, including the appointed mayor of Goma, have declared that the agreement did not concern the AFC/M23, others have been less dismissive, including the AFC leader Corneille Nangaa, who described the deal as “a step, admittedly limited, but useful”.
What’s next after the signing in Washington?
While the Washington agreement is welcome, and a presidential handshake (if that comes to pass) could lend the deal more momentum, it is not clear where mediation efforts will go from there. The agreement provides for an oversight committee comprising the parties, the U.S., Qatar and an AU mediator. The U.S. may well stay more engaged on this file than on other African issues, given its interest in critical minerals, and its pressure on the parties to adhere to the deal’s terms will be vital. But most diplomats and observers expect Washington’s energy to wane as follow-up becomes complicated; Boulos himself sees the June agreement as complementary to African efforts and seems to expect the AU to play a greater role going forward. While Qatar hopes to shepherd a deal between the M23 and Kinshasa to completion, it is unlikely to take on the burden of monitoring the DRC-Rwanda agreement as well.
All eyes are therefore on the continent, and in particular on the African Union. African diplomats have indicated to Crisis Group that they expect to regain a far more prominent role in due course. They recognise the importance of African powers mediating the continent’s conflicts. In March, the AU named President Faure Gnassingbé of Togo as chief mediator, backed by a panel of five facilitators (all former presidents), and the AU commission is preparing to play a greater role. But tensions among African powers – some of which back Kigali and others Kinshasa – will make it difficult for the new mediation team to speak with a united voice for the region. The difficulty has already become evident in the meetings that the mediator and five facilitators have joined in connection with the Doha/Washington effort.
How can momentum be sustained?
The latest U.S.-Qatari mediation effort is a laudable initiative. The talks have helped slow the M23’s rapid advances, which at one point appeared that they might threaten the stability of the government in Kinshasa. But now comes the hard part. Outside actors who support the peace process will have to stay on the ball to ensure that the parties make good on their promises – or risk this latest accord joining the long list of past failed agreements.
The biggest burden may fall upon the AU. If, as widely assumed, it picks up the mediation torch, AU officials will need to put in the diplomatic legwork to empower the AU mediator and five facilitators to work effectively. They will need to find ways to bridge divides among AU member states that to date have been pulling in different directions. Angola, which holds the chair in 2025 and has experience with the mediation process, may be well positioned to take on this task.
Secondly, even if the transition to AU mediation goes seamlessly, significant responsibility for the deal’s success will continue to lie with Washington and Doha, which will need monitor compliance and use their leverage to press each of Kinshasa and Kigali to uphold its side of the bargain. They should underline the urgency of Rwandan withdrawal from the DRC and the need for clear signals from Kinshasa on demobilising the Wazalendo once they regain control of the territories concerned, which cover much of North and South Kivu provinces. They should also press the parties to avoid setting further improbable conditions for continued cooperation. A joint security mechanism outlined in the 27 June deal, while deliberately vaguely worded, calls on the parties to set out plans to deal with the FDLR while respecting international humanitarian law. This mechanism could provide a platform for the parties to work together, and Washington and Doha should therefore press for its implementation.
Doha’s efforts to broker peace between the M23 and Kinshasa will be key.
Thirdly, Doha’s efforts to broker peace between the M23 and Kinshasa will be key. The Washington agreement will mean little on the ground if the Doha track fails to progress. The situation is hugely complicated, as the M23 has the upper hand on the battlefield, and has frequently disassociated itself from diplomatic deals, while Kinshasa is understandably reluctant to engage in talks with a group it views as a proxy. Still, there is space for a negotiated deal if both sides are sufficiently serious about achieving it.
Start with the DRC. In negotiations with the M23, Kinshasa has key red lines – notably it insists on the DRC’s reassertion of control of lost territory and refuses to integrate intact M23 units into its already factious army. These non-negotiable items make it all the more important that the Congolese government give ground on issues that are of lesser importance to Kinshasa but might help talks succeed. For example, Kinshasa could strongly reiterate the place of Tutsis in the Congolese state, the right of return for Congolese Tutsi refugees and its determination to stop hate speech directed at this community. It should also state clearly that it will fulfil the 27 June agreement, in particular the demand for an end to collaboration with the FDLR, clamp down on Congolese officers who do cooperate with the group and signal that it is ready to work with Rwanda in reducing the threat this insurgency poses.
If Rwanda cuts support for the M23 and allows for its gradual withdrawal from areas it has recently conquered, Kinshasa will also have to consider the future of the rebellion’s commanders, undoubtedly the toughest problem at hand. Still, there may be a way forward. The 27 June agreement calls for disarming and demobilising non-state armed groups and for individual reintegration of combatants into the DRC’s national forces. Thus, one way to proceed is that senior commanders could go into exile (as has happened in the past, when the movement’s leaders moved to Rwanda and Uganda) while rank-and-file members of the M23 join the army – though as individuals, not as part of former rebel units. Such an arrangement would need careful monitoring to ensure that the ex-rebels do not return to fighting the state at a later date. It will take hard negotiating to push the M23 to accept breaking up their units, a measure Kigali may also oppose. But unless the sides show flexibility on this point, it is hard to imagine a sustainable end to the war.
Efforts to hold perpetrators accountable for grave crimes committed during the conflict will also be important for breaking the cycle of impunity that has fuelled conflict in the region, but this prospect seems far off at present.
Finally, regional mediators will have to bring other Great Lakes countries into the fold. As described above, competition among the DRC’s neighbours over its resources was a key trigger for the fighting of the last few years. These powers have committed in the past to end recurring cycles of conflict through closer cooperation – notably in the 2013 “Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for DRC and the Region”, which marked the end of the last conflict between the DRC and the M23. The priority must be for all countries to stop using proxy fighters to put pressure on their neighbours or for other ends. Supporting such groups undermines the trust needed to make progress on other vital issues such as trade, refugee return and demobilising the myriad of armed groups that plague the region.