Violence And Herding In The Central African Republic: Time To Act

What’s new? Ten years of crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) have fostered new dynamics in the livestock sector, exacerbating conflict between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers. The government, which has treated transhumance primarily as a security problem, has been unable to curb the violence. So have NGO and UN initiatives.

Why does it matter? Reducing herder-farmer violence is essential for long-term stability in CAR. Bangui now has an unprecedented opportunity to scale it back, as the state gets re-established in rural areas, non-state armed groups weaken there and CAR’s relations warm with neighbouring Chad.

What should be done? To contain herder-farmer violence, Bangui should reassume the regulatory role it abandoned in the 1990s. With the support of international partners, CAR’s authorities should rehabilitate pastoral services they once provided, combat army predation upon herders and revive cross-border cooperation with Chad.

Executive Summary
Violence between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers is a main driver of the conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR), which began in 2013 when a coup d’état plunged the country into civil war. New dynamics that have taken hold since then have made herder-farmer clashes deadlier than before. Attacked from all sides, pastoralists have taken up arms, while two powerful militias have emerged claiming to defend them. Foreign herders have also flocked to CAR, whose pastures are among the richest in the region, while more entrepreneurial forms of managing livestock have worsened frictions. But the government in Bangui now has an unprecedented chance to address the root causes of the violence, having bolstered the state’s presence in rural provinces. It helps as well that the various armed groups battling the state have weakened and relations with neighbouring Chad have improved. To foster lasting peace in the countryside, CAR’s authorities need to re-establish their former regulatory role, rehabilitate the services they once supplied to herders, curtail army abuses and consolidate cooperation with Chad in the livestock sector.

Regularly beset by rebellion, Bangui is inclined to see herder groups primarily as a security threat. Since 2014, two militias made up mainly of herders – Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC) and Retour, Réclamation, Réhabilitation (3R) – have formed, deepening the government’s tendency to conflate pastoralists with insurgents. In 2019, the state signed a peace agreement with the main armed groups it has been fighting since 2013, which was meant to cover herder-farmer conflict as well, but the latter type of violence increased by more than 50 per cent between that year and 2023. In fact, from 2021 onward, as the army regained control of the countryside with the support of Russia and Rwanda, soldiers organised cattle rustling networks similar to those the armed groups had run near the traditional herding corridors. The ensuing theft led pastoralists to abandon these routes, driving their cattle instead through farmers’ fields, which made them vulnerable to reprisal. Herders have accordingly lost what little confidence they had left in the state, increasingly looking to the militias for protection.

UPC rebels at their old Bokolobo headquarters, Ouaka prefecture, Central African Republic, March 2019. CRISIS GROUP / Charles Bouëssel

Over the past ten years, government initiatives aimed at resolving herder-farmer conflict have multiplied, thanks in particular to substantial Western funding, but without putting an end to the cycle of violence. While Bangui has stepped up efforts to raise awareness among nomadic and sedentary populations of the issues, it has largely neglected the pastoral sector since the late 1990s. Management mechanisms and key state services in herding corridors (such as veterinary care) remain in disarray. This infrastructure was essential for regulating herders’ movements and offered them something in exchange for the taxes they formerly paid.

Its absence is all the more glaring with the influx of foreign herders – mainly Chadians who know little about dynamics in CAR – and the rise of what is called néo-élevage. This practice, by which cattle owners employ drovers to herd their livestock from place to place, is a source of numerous conflicts. The drovers are often armed and under great pressure to protect the livestock, while the herds, which are often larger than those of local pastoralists, are difficult to control and regularly damage fields under cultivation. The land law, which has not been updated since the 1960s, does not adequately define the rights and duties of various land users, adding to rural tensions and limiting the effectiveness of international initiatives aimed at ameliorating them.

A third problem in the pastoral sector has been relations between CAR and Chad, which have been stormy since the 2013 coup d’état. Herds coming from Chad – which account for around 70 per cent of the livestock arriving in CAR – are a particular source of conflict, not least because the Chadian herders are often close to the ruling elite in N’Djamena. To better manage the movement of livestock, the two countries signed agreements in 2012 and 2019. But these have not been implemented, even though bilateral tensions have eased of late. In January, the two countries created a joint force to guard the border. In April, N’Djamena also helped broker an agreement between Bangui, on one side, and UPC and 3R representatives, on the other, reintegrating these two militias into the peace process. CAR and Chad should build on these achievements.

Reducing herder-farmer violence is essential for stabilising [Central African Republic].

As Crisis Group emphasised in a 2014 report, reducing herder-farmer violence is essential for stabilising CAR. While the challenges of doing so are numerous, the current moment is particularly favourable for tackling the issue head on. The countryside has become less unstable since 2021, with the army redeploying to the interior and rebel groups losing steam. These developments, along with the partial rapprochement with Chad, offer an opportunity to better protect herders and their livestock, while providing a regulatory environment better suited to today’s pastoral practices, particularly néo-élevage. The state’s return to the hinterland also augurs well for security during the presidential and legislative elections forthcoming in December.

CAR’s government should take advantage of these circumstance to reassert its role as regulator and restore the old mechanisms for managing transhumance, which organised the pastoral sector and brought in substantial tax revenues for the state. In these endeavours, the authorities can count on the support of their traditional Western partners, which, despite suspending some of their budgetary aid to protest Russia’s influence in CAR, remain committed to the country’s recovery, particularly as regards nomadic herding and its impact on stability. New players such as Russia and Rwanda have shown their own interest in reviving the pastoral sector, which could also contribute to curbing violence. Finally, CAR’s authorities should combat predation by the army, such as cattle rustling, and renew cross-border cooperation with Chad.

Bangui/Nairobi/Brussels, 28 May 2025
I. Introduction
Transhumance is one of the main causes of instability in the Central African Republic (CAR). 1 Often described as a conflict within a conflict, the violence associated with this form of livestock management accounts for a significant proportion of the atrocities committed since the country’s crisis began in 2013, when a rebel coalition overthrew President François Bozizé and plunged the country into civil war. 2 Despite a peace agreement in 2019, farmer-herder violence increased by more than half between that date and 2023. 3 Armed groups on both sides of the divide – some hostile to herders and others claiming to be protecting them – have perpetrated massacres. Some of the major incidents, such as one that took place in May 2019 near Paoua (Lim-Pendé prefecture), in which dozens of people were killed, have been investigated by the Special Criminal Court, a hybrid court based in Bangui and tasked with trying serious crimes committed in CAR since 2003. 4

The causes of this violence are diverse: some incidents are linked to land disputes between herders and farmers, others to predation (cattle rustling or racketeering) and the ensuing retribution, and still others to communal rivalries between nomadic and settled populations. 5 A country with 5.6 million people in 2024, CAR has an estimated four million head of cattle, and is a crossroads for livestock migrating in search of pasture, with herds from many countries converging there. 6 Nomadic herders in CAR come from a number of different ethnic groups, in particular the Fulani (who have long dominated the livestock sector, with around 250,000 herders), Arab communities and the Hausa. 7 The availability of lush grazing land in CAR is attracting a growing number of herders from neighbouring countries, notably Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Sudan. 8

Herders face many identity-related prejudices.
Herders face many identity-related prejudices. Settled populations tend to see them as foreigners because of their nomadic way of life and their cultures and languages, which are far removed from their own. 9 The CAR authorities, meanwhile, accuse them of being the main culprits in rural armed conflict in recent years and conflate herders with rebel fighters. Herders, most of whom practise Islam, also suffer from the stigma attached to all of CAR’s Muslim community, which is considered non-Indigenous and has been largely excluded from the state since independence in 1958. 10

Despite the difficulties they face, herders are key economic players in CAR. Herding accounts for around 15 per cent of gross domestic product and employs 35 per cent of the country’s rural population. 11 The sector is dominated by cattle herding, with sales of beef contributing around 25 per cent of export earnings. There is also nearly three billion CFA francs (€4.5 million) in untapped tax revenue in cattle herding. 12 Grazing reserves cover sixteen million hectares (around a quarter of the countryʼs surface area), half of which are still unused. 13 Despite its great economic potential, the sector remains largely underdeveloped, notably due to the persistence of rural conflict and the dearth of pastoral services.

For more than a decade, international organisations, including UN agencies, have made stopping farmer-herder conflict a priority in their work in CAR. Donors such as the European Union are showing interest in the sectorʼs economic potential. So, too, are Russia and Rwanda, which are now the countryʼs main security partners. Moscow is particularly interested in management of abattoirs, while Kigali has signed economic agreements with Bangui, including in the livestock sector, in 2019 and 2021. 14 These initiatives have not yet brought significant investment into CAR, but they are evidence that it could be forthcoming.

This report looks at new dynamics in herder-farmer violence in CAR. It is based on over a hundred interviews with herders, farmers, national and local authorities, members of civil society and international organisations, army officers and representatives of rebel groups. Conducted between June 2023 and April 2025, the interviews took place in Bangui and the prefectures of Ombella-M’Poko, Nana-Gribizi, Ouham-Fafa, Bamingui-Bangoran and Ouaka, as well as in the Moyen-Chari province of Chad. Crisis Group also spoke to representatives of international institutions working on transhumance, notably in Belgium, France and the United States. Most interlocutors were men, with a significant number under the age of 20. Although access to women living in pastoral environments is often difficult, Crisis Group was able to speak to around ten and took their views into account in the research. The report also draws on previous Crisis Group publications, as well as those of humanitarian and research organisations. 15

II. Transhumance and Violence: New Dynamics
Security in CAR has improved since 2021, when Bangui and its security partners – the Russian paramilitary company Wagner and Rwanda – regained control of most of the countryʼs major towns, which had previously been occupied by rebels. 16 While exposing civilians, and in particular herders, to atrocities by the army and its allies, this offensive has led to the fragmentation of the armed groups, which no longer pose an existential threat to the state. Nevertheless, several rural areas of the country are still riddled with pockets of insecurity. On one hand, former rebel centres are trying to retain their grip on mining areas or turning to banditry to make money. On the other, the emergence of new dynamics in the livestock sector over the last ten years has exacerbated farmer-herder violence.

A. Militarisation of Transhumance
In 2013, a putsch by the Séléka, a rebel coalition with a Muslim majority, plunged CAR into crisis. Civil war broke out when local people formed militias (known as anti-balaka groups) to fight rebels and attack Muslim civilians, including from nomadic or semi-nomadic herding communities such as the Fulani. The UN described the wave of violence against Muslims and Fulani in the west of the country between 2013 and 2014 as “ethnic cleansing”. 17 Most herders lost their cattle and took refuge in Cameroon and Chad, where some have taken up farming. 18 Their prospects of returning to CAR remain dim as they lack the money to reacquire sizeable herds.

The violence contributed to the emergence of two powerful armed groups. 19 The first, Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC), is an offshoot of the Séléka and was founded in 2014 by Ali Darassa, a Fulani rebel leader. First active in Ouaka, a prefecture in the centre of the country with a high concentration of pasture, this movement then conquered new territories in the east and south, in the prefectures of Haute-Kotto and Mbomou. The second, the Retour, Réclamation, Réhabilitation (3R) movement, was set up at the end of 2015 by Sidiki Abbas, another Fulani rebel leader. Based in the west of the country, it aims to protect herders and bring back all exiled Central African Fulani. 20

From the moment they were created, [the armed groups UPC and 3R] have served to exacerbate farmer-herder conflict.

From the moment they were created, these movements have served to exacerbate farmer-herder conflict. They have engaged in criminal activity, including racketeering and trafficking, and imposed heavy taxes on herders under the guise of defending them. Often paid in cattle and proportional to herd size, these taxes have risen steadily since 2014, impoverishing livestock owners. 21 The two groups have also systematically exploited the population for their own benefit, levying taxes on gold and diamond mining, trade and road traffic. 22 Taking the place of state authorities, they have set up a system of violent arbitration of farmer-herder conflict, going after people suspected of attacking herders and carrying out massacres in villages accused of profiting from cattle rustling. 23

Locals have often retaliated by attacking herders, whom they equate with the armed groups. 24 Since 2016, UPCʼs territorial expansion toward the country’s south east has encouraged the creation of self-defence militias, exposing nomadic herders to revenge attacks. 25 The risks have led herders to avoid the usual transhumance corridors. In so doing, they have encroached upon cultivated fields, exacerbating conflicts that are now waged with weapons of war. 26 In July 2023, in Diki (Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture), thirteen civilian men were killed by nomadic herders who accused the village of profiting from cattle rustling. 27 More recently, on 15 February 2025, settled inhabitants of Ouham-Pendé, forming a militia, attacked Fulani herding villages near Gbaforo in revenge for the death of one of their relatives, killing around 50 civilians, according to local sources. 28

Today, UPC and 3R each have several thousand well-armed fighters and continue to recruit mainly from the Fulani communities targeted by the settled populations. 29 Nevertheless, though the two groups are still causing trouble in their areas of influence, they no longer constitute a force capable of taking over the country, after an offensive by government forces in 2021 (see Section III.B.).

In April, following negotiations in NʼDjamena with the CAR government, under the aegis of Chad and in the presence of traditional Fulani chiefs, UPC and 3R made a surprise announcement that they would return to the 2019 peace process. 30 Afterward, the two groups said they had declared a ceasefire and ordered their fighters to confine themselves to bases pending either demobilisation or integration into the CAR army and internal security forces. While the sincerity of their commitment is questionable (in recent years, UPC has repeatedly announced its intention to return to the peace process, before backing down), Chadʼs role as guarantor of the agreement is promising. NʼDjamena has leverage over these groups, whose leaders regularly visit Chadian territory. 31

Deadly conflicts linked to transhumance in the Central African Republic (2016–2025)Source: Crisis Group research, Natural Earth, OSM. May 2025 / CRISIS GROUP

B. An Influx of Foreign Nomadic Herders
The demographics of the herder population in CAR have also changed over the last decade. Attracted by the lushness of CAR’s pasture, or forced out of their former grazing areas by climate, security or regulatory constraints, a growing number of foreign citizens are bringing their herds into the country and for increasingly lengthy periods. Some are settling temporarily in CAR or staying permanently. In 2021, only 5 per cent of the cattle arriving at the Bouboui abattoir, which supplies Bangui, were owned by CAR herders. 32 Although it is a dangerous activity, transhumance in CAR is no riskier than it is anywhere else in the region, and many foreigners find that the country’s pastures are richer than those at home. 33

These migratory movements follow an established pattern that has shaped the history of pastoralism in the country. 34 The first nomadic herders arrived in what was to become CAR from the future Cameroon in the 1920s, in search of better pastures and fleeing the excessive taxes imposed by certain traditional chieftaincies. A second wave of herders from Chad, Niger and Sudan arrived in the country in the 1970s and 1980s, driven out of their regions by drought and demographic pressure, which, as a result of deforestation and the expansion of farmland, had made grazing land increasingly scarce. 35 More recently, CAR has seen the arrival of herders from Nigeria, who are fleeing more restrictive regulations, the effects of climate change and insecurity linked to the jihadist groups that hold sway in much of that country’s north. 36

Since the war in Sudan started in April 2023, many Sudanese herders have chosen to bring their livestock into CAR and even to stay all year round.

Insecurity in the Sahel and the war in Sudan have accentuated this trend. 37 In the Sahel, where jihadists recruit widely from their community, Fulani herders are heavily stigmatised, exposing them to violence from armies and militias. 38 Since the war in Sudan started in April 2023, many Sudanese herders have chosen to bring their livestock into CAR and even to stay all year round. 39

Faced with this influx, the country could become the regional hub for pastoralism, which could overwhelm its management capacities and exacerbate herder-farmer violence, especially as CAR authorities have little control of foreign transhumance. 40 The marked corridors are now overused and no longer offer sufficient grazing land, forcing herders to stray outside them, at the risk of encroaching upon farmland. Foreign herders are not always proficient in local languages or practices, which may create tensions with the settled population. 41 They are also moving into regions that are not accustomed to transhumance, such as the Lobaye prefecture in the country’s south west, where conflict between farmers and herders is on the rise. 42

This situation fuels anger among the settled populations, who primarily see the ill effects of transhumance, such as destroyed crops, diminished vegetation and reduced access to game for hunters. 43 These problems have led some villages to declare themselves “anti-herder”, barring nomadic herders from passing through, or to attack them and their property directly. It is difficult to determine the extent of these initiatives, which originate from local chieftaincies and often with the authorities’ tacit agreement, but they have appeared particularly in the centre of the country and near the border with Chad, where the influx of foreign pastoralists is particularly noticeable. 44

C. The Fraught Rise of Néo-élevage
Since 2013, the rise of pastoral entrepreneurs in the region, particularly in Chad, and the impoverishment of Central African herders following attacks by anti-balaka militias have also encouraged the development in CAR of a pastoral practice known as néo-élevage (neo-pastoralism). 45 Unlike traditional herding, in which the herd’s owner migrates along with it, the neo-pastoralist is an entrepreneur who employs a drover to oversee the livestock’s movement. The drover is responsible for the herd’s safety and often comes from a community close to that of his employer, for reasons of trust. During rest stops in the transhumance corridor, the drover may hire someone else to watch the cattle as they graze. 46 This work force sees herding as a business rather than a way of life. 47 In the interest of profitability, neo-pastoralists generally have larger herds than traditional pastoralists.

The use of intermediaries, the concentration of livestock and its management as a financial asset have transformed the herding sector in many countries. 48 In CAR, neo-pastoralists are mainly influential people from neighbouring countries, including military officers and senior civil servants from Chad and Sudan, both countries where the phenomenon has become widespread in recent decades. 49 Prominent Central Africans, including members of the government, senior public-sector officials and wealthy traders, are also beginning to take up neo-pastoralism. 50

[Neo-pastoralism practices] increase the risk of conflict with settled populations.

These practices increase the risk of conflict with settled populations. To deal with insecurity, drovers are frequently armed by their employers and are under great pressure to protect livestock at all costs, with deductions from their wages in the event of loss or theft. 51 Also, the cowherds hired by the drovers during the migration are sometimes encouraged to let the cattle graze in planted fields, as the crops are more nutritious than other vegetation. 52 The large herds belonging to neo-pastoralists, which number several hundred head, are therefore more difficult to monitor than traditional herds, which rarely exceed 150 head, and more likely to damage crops. 53

Neo-pastoralism has also played a big part in eroding other pastoral traditions, which may encourage farmer-herder violence. It is rare for drovers to take their families with them when they move herds to pasture, unlike traditional herders, who usually do. According to some observers, the absence of women and children and the young age of the drovers – often under 20 – increases the risk of violent acts. 54 “The herder knows that he has a family to protect, and he is cautious”, a Fulani traditional chief explained. “The [drovers], however, are often irresponsible young people, travelling through the country without wives or children”. 55 Accurate or not, such ideas about drovers undermine their interactions with settled communities and can be a source of tension. 56

A herder and his cattle near Alindao, Basse-Kotto, Central African Republic, April 2019.Paul Lorgerie

III. A Decade of Public Action with Limited Impact
These new dynamics in the livestock sector have reinforced CAR authorities՚ perception that transhumance is primarily a security issue. For this reason, Bangui has favoured military operations against armed groups claiming to be defending herders, to the detriment of investment in pastoral management mechanisms and infrastructure, which have been in decline since the late 1990s. Since 2021, the re-establishment of state control in much of CAR has been accompanied by increased interest in pastoral issues among partners, notably the EU and the World Bank. Despite suspending some of their budgetary aid to CAR, against the backdrop of geopolitical rivalry with Russia and due to the lack of reforms and transparency in public finances, Western donors have confirmed – and, in some cases, even strengthened – their commitment to peaceful transhumance.

A. A Security-focused Response
For the CAR government, transhumance is above all a question of national security. UPC and 3R, which claim to be protecting livestock herders, are among the most powerful armed groups in the country. Since they were founded, they have occupied swathes of territory, blocked the return of state administrators and regularly attacked the UN Integrated Mission for the Stabilisation of CAR, or MINUSCA. 57 For several years, Bangui was unable to rely on the army (which disbanded after the 2013 coup) to deal with this threat and opted to share power with the armed groups. 58 In 2019, the state signed a peace agreement with fourteen armed groups, temporarily suspending hostilities in the hinterland in exchange for ministerial posts for their leaders, including those of UPC and 3R. 59

This agreement identified reducing farmer-herder conflict as a prerequisite for peace, but it proposed a security-based solution. 60 To safeguard the transhumance corridors, it provided for creating a new army division, the Unités spéciales mixtes de sécurité (USMS), made up of 2,000 members, including regular soldiers and fighters from all the signatory armed groups. 61 But lack of consensus among the government, armed groups and foreign partners about these new units’ purpose, along with erratic management, led the initiative to fail. 62 During their training, for example, CAR authorities called on USMS personnel to help protect Chinese mining company sites and take part in offensives against 3R. 63 Fearing that the USMS would be diverted from their primary mission to fight alongside the Russian paramilitary group Wagner, the EU suspended funding for the project in 2021, putting a de facto end to it. In the end, only 230 USMS units were integrated into the national army, less than 10 per cent of the initial target. 64

Two years after the peace agreement [between the CAR government and fourteen armed groups in 2019] was signed, hostilities resumed.

Two years after the peace agreement was signed, hostilities resumed. In January 2021, after the re-election of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), a rebel alliance made up of several signatories to the agreement, including UPC and 3R, launched a fresh attack on Bangui. 65 This time, Bangui had the means to respond: thanks to its partnerships with Russia and Rwanda, CAR’s army not only repelled the rebels, but also launched a counteroffensive to go after them in their rural strongholds. 66 Russian paramilitary support, which continues to this day, has also accelerated the training and redeployment of national armed forces across the country. 67 Since then, the army has regained control of urban centres, while the armed groups, militarily weakened and politically divided, retain only a limited presence in the hinterland.

This military campaign mainly targeted UPC and 3R, in the centre and west of the country, because they operate near mines and strategic roads (such as the one linking CAR to Cameroon). By continuing to conflate rebels and herders, though, it has exposed the latter to abuse by the army and its allies. Numerous accounts, including from local administrative authorities, accuse the army and Wagner of massacres, rapes and looting in herders’ villages and camps. 68 In December 2021, according to a UN report, the army attacked the Boyo group of villages, killing dozens of people, including children, and ransacking homes. 69

The army redeployment has also encouraged abuse of nomadic herders. After an initial phase of systematically targeting herders, the CAR army and Wagner reduced the scale of attacks in 2022, but they have engaged in predatory behaviour like that of militias. People interviewed by Crisis Group reported cases of racketeering and cattle rustling in the country’s north west, centre and north east, as well as cases in which soldiers demanded payment to settle herder-farmer disputes. 70 Such abuses are due partly to delay and misappropriation of salaries, which plague the armed forces, as well as poor recruitment procedures. 71 The criminality lends legitimacy to the militias: when soldiers join with young villagers to steal cattle, herders have no choice but to turn to these groups to defend themselves. 72

These practices also damage the army’s reputation. Gendarmes and administrators interviewed by Crisis Group said they were angered to see soldiers overstepping their bounds by demanding illicit payments and, worse, stealing cattle. 73 While the high command has taken corrective action, such as by arresting an officer for cattle rustling in the north east in November 2023, the problem remains huge. The reopening a few months earlier of the permanent military tribunal in Bangui, which has tempered predation, raised hopes of dealing more systematically with these excesses, but the court’s capacity is limited. 74

B. Deficiencies in the Non-security Response
1. Services in disarray
For decades, the state offered useful services to herders in CAR’s transhumance corridors. From the 1960s onward, these routes were dotted with veterinary centres and dip tanks designed to remove ticks from animals. Herders considered these services essential for keeping their livestock healthy. 75

CAR also had functioning state and grassroots bodies that helped organise the pastoral sector and manage conflicts. Founded in the 1980s, the Pastoral Interest Groups (GIP), which worked within socio-professional associations such as the National Federation of CAR Herders (FNEC), enabled herders to form unions to defend their interests. 76 In 1986, the authorities also set up Agropastoral Action Zones (ZAGROP), guaranteeing herders exclusive grazing rights in designated areas. 77 Between 1988 and 1995, this mechanism was adapted to small groups of herders via the GIP. 78 In 1995, the authorities sought to improve conflict management by setting up herder-farmer associations, which offered conflict resolution services. 79

Toward the end of the 1990s, however, as the state was weakened by a series of political crises, these mechanisms gradually fell into disuse. 80 By the time of the coup d’état in 2013, the veterinary centres had almost completely disappeared, while management and representative bodies such as the National Agency for the Development of Livestock (ANDE), a technical body reporting to the Ministry of Livestock, and the ZAGROPs were no longer operational. 81

The FNEC [National Federation of CAR Herders] has reasserted its role in managing farmer-herder conflict.

The FNEC has reasserted its role in managing farmer-herder conflict. In 2021, herders made use of this union, which has representatives throughout the country, to voice their grievances about army and Wagner atrocities. 82 After this meeting, in April 2022, with the support of Wagner paramilitaries, the FNEC began distributing identification cards to herders to distinguish them from rebels. 83 These cards are sold at the price of 10,000 CFA francs (around €15) for CAR nationals and 12,000 CFA francs (around €18) for foreigners. 84 Most of the herders Crisis Group interviewed for this report own one. Sale of these cards is now the FNEC’s main source of income and is helping rebuild the organisation’s capabilities. 85

Distribution of these cards is an important step in stopping arbitrary attacks on migratory herders. This service is not routinely provided, however, being limited to a few urban centres. Some herders, particularly foreigners, are unaware that the cards exist, while others are reluctant to travel long distances in the bush to pick them up in town. The cards are also easily falsified, leading to many herders being swindled by people claiming to be state or FNEC representatives. 86

Herders also protect themselves by other means. In the west of the country, which has better internet service thanks to its proximity to Cameroon, herders use Facebook or WhatsApp to help identify stolen cattle and intercept the thieves, sometimes with the help of local or Cameroonian law enforcement bodies. In the rest of the country, more affluent livestock herders and neo-pastoralists hire trucks or boats to transport cattle between grazing areas or to market, thereby limiting the risk of attacks, which usually occur in the bush. 87 While effective, these measures are still limited to certain areas and to certain groups of herders.

2. Dangerous political manoeuvring
Once the rebel groups had been weakened militarily, President Touadéra tried to secure the political support of the Fulani, who dominate the livestock sector in CAR. Bangui has supported the reactivation of FNEC, which is mainly made up of members of this ethnic group. The president appointed the mayors of herding municipalities who sit on the federation’s board (since CAR has not held municipal elections for 35 years, FNEC could not operate without these appointments). In 2022, Touadéra also personally attended FNEC’s general meeting, demonstrating his influence in the federation. 88

The state’s outreach to herders since 2021 has also included numerous awareness-raising workshops designed to promote peaceful transhumance. While the state deserves credit for demonstrating its concern in this way, these initiatives have sometimes deviated from their stated purpose. Some workshops were used to convince UPC rebels to join the army or pro-government militias – or to rally political support for the president among herders. 89 In January, as part of a nationwide mobilisation backing Touadéra’s candidacy in the presidential election scheduled for December, herders and livestock traders demonstrated in Bangui. 90

These initiatives do not necessarily improve the settled population’s perception of herders. On the contrary, they often help associate certain Fulani groups with the ruling party, which can place them (including former fighters who have expressed their willingness to disarm) in the sights of 3R, UPC or other militias opposed to the state. Herders may thus be exposed to additional violence, stoking local conflict. 91

UPC rebels board a pickup truck at their old Bokolobo headquarters, Ouaka prefecture, Central African Republic, March 2019.CRISIS GROUP / Charles Bouëssel

3. An obsolete legislative framework
The legislative framework for managing transhumance has become obsolete, particularly since new dynamics transformed the pastoral sector. The CAR Land Code, introduced in 1965, has never been revised. 92 The absence of laws delineating the rights of various users of land – farmers, herders, miners, hunters, forest rangers – encourages conflict while leaving the state without legal means of stopping it. A draft agropastoral land law was drawn up in 2021, but it cannot be passed before a new land code, which is still in preparation, is promulgated. As it stands, the new code gives priority to other sectors deemed to be more lucrative, such as mining, water and forestry. 93

Faced with this legal vacuum, civil society has developed alternative solutions in the form of “social contracts”. 94 These arrangements clarify, at the local level, the responsibilities and rights of parties involved in transhumance and define the rules in the event of infringements. Although not legally binding, these initiatives have sometimes succeeded in introducing a degree of regulation to situations where the judicial system is weak. 95

C. Multiple, Poorly Coordinated International Responses

Since 2013, conflicts linked to transhumance have been at the heart of international action in CAR. To coordinate the many projects, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) set up a Transhumance Working Group (GTT, by the French acronym) in 2015. 96 But the Ministry of Livestock’s determination to control the GTT and difficulties in adapting to changes on the ground have limited the impact of these interventions. 97 The government is nevertheless taking a renewed interest in these issues. In May 2024, CAR authorities held a national conference, facilitated by MINUSCA, to find solutions to the insecurity affecting the sector. During the discussions, the participants stressed the need to revive the services and organisations that managed transhumance in the past, as well as the importance of improving monitoring of pastoral flows. 98

International organisations, in particular MINUSCA and NGOs such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and Concordis, are involved in several activities. Some have helped make transhumance a political priority; others have provided technical support to the Ministry of Livestock or directly to herders. 99 Several organisations are trying to strengthen ties between nomadic herders and settled populations, particularly by encouraging formation of local committees for conflict prevention and resolution. Made up of representatives of herders and socio-economic groups affected by transhumance, these bodies have helped raise awareness, facilitated amicable agreements and set up early warning systems for predicting livestock movements. 100 In 2024, the state and MINUSCA also set up Prefectural Implementation Committees (CMOP in French), as set out in the 2019 peace agreement, which aim to educate the population about transhumance issues. 101

Official data is lacking, but nearly all the players interviewed by Crisis Group said the local committees have reduced the number of clashes between farmers and herders since the first few years of the crisis. 102 Yet these bodies are not present everywhere, and they have no means of enforcing their decisions.

Although it is helping restore trust between nomads and settled people, international action is suffering from a lack of coordination, while questions linger about its sustainability. While these initiatives may be individually effective and generally appreciated by the population, their existence depends on the priorities of the organisations that set them up, which are insufficiently harmonised with one another and those of the CAR authorities. 103 Sometimes these players also use different methods. For example, local committees have different names and operate differently depending on their organisational affiliation, raising problems of consistency. 104 The Ministry of Livestock, meanwhile, lacks visibility over international action and has difficulty coordinating its non-governmental partners. 105

D. The Challenges of Transhumance between Chad and CAR

Although it is a major source of herder-farmer conflict, transhumance across the border between Chad and CAR has never been effectively managed. 106 The first bilateral agreements on the subject, providing for regulation of livestock movements on both sides of the border and deployment of a joint military patrol, were signed in 2012. 107 But the agreements sat unfulfilled, little more than words on paper, from 2013 to 2023, due to diplomatic tensions between the two countries, exacerbated by the coup in Bangui. 108

Following the closure of the CAR-Chad border in May 2014, Chadian cattle were entering CAR illegally, with the support of Chadian civilian and military authorities. At the time, N’Djamena denied the existence of transhumance between Chad and CAR and rejected responsibility for the violence associated with Chadian neo-pastoralism. 109 Bangui, meanwhile, alleged that its sovereignty had been violated, while collecting illegal taxes on livestock entering CAR territory. 110 Despite a new agreement in 2019, the two countries have never coordinated their policies. 111

Although relations between [Chad and CAR] have eased since 2023, managing transhumance is not yet a high priority for either capital.

Although relations between the two neighbours have eased since 2023, managing transhumance is not yet a high priority for either capital. In May 2023, Bangui, which Chad had long accused of harbouring armed groups hostile to its government, authorised N’Djamena to launch joint military operations with its armed forces to root out Chadian rebels based in CAR. 112 Bangui was pleased with Chad’s decision that March to exile former President Bozizé, who continued to lead the CPC, the main rebel coalition, to Guinea-Bissau. 113 The reopening of the border in May 2024 was an important indication of a return to normal. More good signs came the following January, when the two countries created a bilateral force to combat cross-border crime, and in April, when Chad helped bring UPC and 3R back into the 2019 peace agreement. 114 The rapprochement is encouraging, but Bangui and N’Djamena have not yet begun discussions on implementing the 2012 and 2019 agreements on transhumance.

The lack of collaboration is also reflected in civil society. The main pastoral associations in the region, such as FNEC, are part of the Billital Maarobé Network, which, since it was founded in West Africa in 2003, has become a laboratory for innovative ideas for responding to changes affecting the sector, whether in the security or climate domains. The network is strong in the Sahel, but much less active in Central Africa, largely because of failures to regulate transhumance between Chad and CAR, damaging relations between herders in the two countries and limiting the scope for cooperation. 115

IV. Toward Safe, Peaceful Transhumance
The improvement in the security situation since 2021 and the easing of relations with Chad represent an opportunity for CAR and its partners – notably MINUSCA and the EU – to tackle the violence associated with transhumance head on. To this end, CAR authorities should cease addressing the issue exclusively from a security perspective, seeking also to harness the sector’s economic potential, particularly by reasserting their role as regulators. Bangui could also call on Russia and Rwanda, which have expressed an interest in exploring economic opportunities associated with transhumance, to restore pastoral services.

A. Adapting to New Dynamics
1. Demilitarising transhumance
The military operations conducted against UPC and 3R by CAR’s army and its allies since 2021 have helped to reduce the power of these groups, but they will not be enough to eradicate them in the hinterland. In the short term, Bangui and UPC and 3R representatives should each fulfil the pledges they made in April to revive the 2019 peace agreement. UPC and 3R should lay down their arms to prevent unrest during the December elections. Yet to bring lasting stability to a country that has been plagued for decades by banditry and militia activity, the government will also need to maintain its long-term commitment to administrative and financial decentralisation, as well as to development of CAR’s vast rural areas. 116

In the meantime, CAR authorities could take steps to deprive UPC and 3R of legitimacy among herders. To this end, the government needs to keep combating bad practices within the army. First, the general staff should ensure that soldiers receive their pay and deployment bonuses on time, to reduce the temptation to engage in racketeering. Bangui could also strengthen the capacity of the military justice system to deal with criminal behaviour by soldiers. CAR has already shown that it can crack down on predatory policing. In August 2023, an interministerial order set up a brigade to get rid of illegal barriers – unauthorised checkpoints where soldiers extort “tolls” from passing motorists. 117 Consisting of soldiers, police, gendarmes and personnel from the Ministries of Transport and Finance, this unit has dismantled dozens of illegal barriers (though some have been quickly reinstalled). Bangui could build on this initiative to curtail illegal taxation in the transhumance corridors.

A herder and his cattle near Alindao, Basse-Kotto, Central African Republic, April 2019.Paul Lorgerie

Ensuring herders’ safety also means doing more to combat cattle rustling. The alert systems set up via Facebook and WhatsApp in the country’s west could be replicated in other areas with internet service, for example on the outskirts of major cities, with the police intervening if a theft is reported. To limit racketeering and theft, which are common near abattoirs, the government and its partners could also provide financial support for transport of livestock by truck to these facilities.

2. Adapting to the new demographics of nomadic herders

Given the influx of foreign herders, including neo-pastoralists, the distribution of nomadic herders in CAR’s neighbourhood could be optimised to reduce conflict. The state should make a granular assessment, including via satellite imagery, of the carrying capacity of pastures and the number of livestock in transit to each one. 118 This assessment would enable existing transhumance corridors to be extended, new ones to be opened in sparsely populated areas and herders to be directed toward appropriate routes. Nomadic herders would gain from following this mapping to avoid competing for insufficient pasture or facing the risk of attack. 119

In the long term, CAR’s government, with the support of its partners, should refine the national livestock strategy and encourage trends that are transforming the sector, such as settlement of nomadic herders. The aim is not to force the disappearance of nomadic lifestyles and herding culture, but to support those who wish to become sedentary – for reasons of security, livestock management or access to health care and education – in particular by offering them places to settle and better adapted breeds of cattle.

B. Rethinking the Management of Transhumance
1. Improving identification of herders
To facilitate checks by the security forces and combat the conflation of herders and rebels, FNEC would benefit from extending distribution of herders’ identity cards. It should also hold sensitisation sessions on the traditions of transhumance in CAR, in order to better inform foreign herders and the drovers employed by the neo-pastoralists. To ease access for herders, FNEC could, with support from Western donors, set up temporary posts along transhumance corridors during the dry season. Distributing these cards more widely would provide a more reliable estimate of the volume of transhumance, thus supporting the efforts proposed above to optimise the distribution of herders in grazing lands.

In the long term, the identification of herders would make it possible to set up a system for marking livestock and tracing meat, making it easier to combat cattle theft. 120 This kind of system could link herders to their livestock in a register accessible to law enforcement agencies, markets and abattoirs, enabling stolen livestock to be tracked at every stage.

2. Reviving management mechanisms and infrastructure

The state should reactivate the transhumance management mechanisms that existed until the 1990s, including the Pastoral Action Zones, Pastoral Units and herder-farmer associations. Restoring these organisations would provide a framework for guaranteeing the rights of all groups involved in transhumance and facilitate enforcement of the new land code that is being prepared (see Section IV.B.4 below).

At the same time, reviving services in the transhumance corridors would encourage herders to use these routes again, helping to contain the violence. 121 Services such as watering troughs, dip tanks or vaccination yards are essential to ensure herd health, provided they are accompanied by efforts to train qualified staff to manage them. It would also be easier to protect herders faced with the persistent threat of armed groups if the service stations were placed in signposted areas secured by law enforcement. Lastly, new services would help attract neo-pastoralists’ herds to the supervised corridors, promoting oversight of the sector and reducing the risk of farmer-herder conflict.

Such services could include mobile health clinics (particularly for reproductive health), temporary schools and mechanical equipment for tasks traditionally reserved for women, such as milking or churning butter. These facilities would encourage nomadic herders to move with their wives and children, strengthening their economic resilience and allaying suspicions among settled populations.

Donors such as the EU have already shown an interest in the project and could fund at least part of the works. Russia and Rwanda, which are seeking to expand their economic footprint in CAR alongside their security partnership with the government, could also become involved in these projects. Such initiatives could be jeopardised, however, by the suspension of funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and by the growing trend in Western countries to reduce foreign aid. 122 Accordingly, CAR’s authorities should focus their efforts on the transhumance corridors most used by herders, creating a range of services and protections that could produce a domino effect in neighbouring areas.

In return for the services provided, CAR’s government could levy taxes to offset the sums invested. Whether they own livestock or husband the animals of others, herders understand the need to keep herds healthy and would be willing to pay for these services. 123 Tax collection would also be facilitated by the concentration of herders in defined areas. Redistribution (even partially) of these taxes at the local level would improve how herders are perceived by settled populations, especially if the authorities communicate the benefits effectively.

3. Increasing awareness
The government’s awareness-raising initiatives should move away from their present partisan logic and focus on reducing the stigma that herders face. The state should involve other ministries, such as agriculture and water and forestry, in the work under way by the Ministry of Livestock to reaffirm the benefits of transhumance for all parts of the population, including the boost it gives to trade and the availability of meat. Herders also bring in draught oxen that can be used to plough fields, lightening farmers’ workload.

These joint missions would also help better inform herders, in particular the drovers and other staff employed by neo-pastoralists, about CAR’s customs, while preparing settled populations for the arrival of nomadic herders in their area. They could also encourage farmers to clearly mark their fields with signs, fences or trees, to prevent unintentional destruction of crops.

The Prefectural Implementation Committees (CMOPs) provide an ideal operational framework for such action. FNEC could join forces with these committees to raise awareness of CAR’s pastoral practices among foreign herders, particularly neo-pastoralists, and provide them with identification cards.

4. Accelerating land reform
In the medium term, CAR’s government should harmonise the different uses of land more effectively by speeding up reform of the framework land law. Passing the new law would also allow the state to collect more property taxes, almost an additional $22 million, according to the World Bank. 124 In the meantime, the state could, on a temporary basis, establish specific development plans for the areas most concerned by pastoralism to regulate various land uses and reduce conflict. This type of solution has already been tried in the country’s east, where the government has delegated the regional development plan to the conservation NGO African Parks. 125

C. Harmonising International Initiatives
To improve the effectiveness of public action, it is essential to bring the various international initiatives relating to transhumance into better alignment. The GTT – set up in 2015 by the FAO as a framework for coordination among the government, donors, UN agencies and NGOs – could be revitalised and equipped with a cooperative governance system to overcome the obstacles that may have hampered its action in the past. The consensus among the main players involved in transhumance, expressed at the national conference in 2024, is an encouraging sign in this respect.

Relaunching such a structure would give the state and its partners greater visibility over the projects each of them are carrying out. It would also provide an operational framework for optimising the efforts of the various players. In particular, it could help standardise the role and powers of the local farmer-herder conflict prevention and resolution committees, which could be increased in number and extended in terms of their distribution across the country.

D. Reviving Cooperation with Chad
The easing of relations between Chad and CAR offers room for manoeuvre to revive the transhumance agreements of 2012 and 2019, in the process enhancing regional stability. Regulating cross-border transhumance should be the priority, and the first step could be to carry out census and awareness-raising operations at border posts. These agreements need to be implemented at the government level, but they should also involve rural communities on both sides of the border. 126

The joint patrols created in January are a prerequisite for successful cooperation between the two countries. In particular, they could work to reduce violence and cattle rustling to prevent crises linked to the influx of nomadic herders from the Sahel and to better combat rebels along the border.

Improving management of transhumance between Chad and CAR will also require better representation of herders at the transnational level. FNEC could draw on existing organisations, such as the Billital Maarobé Network, of which it is already a member, to create a framework for discussion with Chadian herders and give them more opportunity to voice their grievances when transhumance strategies are drawn up at the national and sub-regional levels. 127

V. Conclusion
Ten years of crisis in CAR have exacerbated conflicts in the livestock sector, a pillar of the country’s economy. But the return of the state to the provinces in 2021 and warmer relations with Chad now offer an unprecedented opportunity for Bangui to curb the violence associated with transhumance. While the government’s response to date has been focused on security, it has shown willingness to take other action in this area, as demonstrated by the national conference in 2024. Despite uncoordinated interventions, NGOs and UN agencies have also shown keen interest in the issue, as have the EU and new players such as Russia and Rwanda.

This favourable situation should encourage Bangui to go beyond a merely security-based approach to tackle the root causes of the herder-farmer violence that is jeopardising the broader peace in CAR, as well as to give more consideration to the most sustainable forms of herding for the country. In particular, the authorities should rethink the management of transhumance by restoring the state’s role as regulator, reviving pastoral services that are lying dormant and providing the country with a legislative framework better suited to today’s circumstances. Unlocking the economic potential of herding would also enable CAR’s government to generate valuable tax revenue, which is essential for the country’s long-term development.

Bangui/Nairobi/Brussels, 28 May 2025
Appendix A: Main Events in CAR between 2014 and 2025

23 March 2013
Coup d’état by the Séléka. President François Bozizé is overthrown. Michel Djotodia takes power.

April 2013
Transition roadmap signed in N’Djamena, Chad, under the aegis of Economic Community of Central African States.

5 December 2013
Capture of Bangui by anti-balaka militias opposed to the Séléka. Launch of the French military operation Sangaris, in support of the African Union’s International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA).

January-February 2014
Catherine Samba-Panza is appointed president of the transition, as the ex-Séléka forces withdraw to the north and east of the country.

24 July 2014
Signature in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo of the first immediate cessation of hostilities agreement between ex-Séléka and anti-balaka forces.

September 2014
Arrival of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which takes over from MISCA.

April 2015
Peace agreement signed in Nairobi, Kenya between former Presidents Bozizé and Djotodia. The agreement is contested by the transitional authorities, however.

4-11 May 2015
National reconciliation forum in Bangui bringing together political players, representatives of militias and civil society. It made a number of major recommendations, including an end to impunity, the disarmament of militias and the holding of free elections.

December 2015
Presidential and legislative elections, against the backdrop of high levels of insecurity outside Bangui, incomplete disarmament of militias and mistrust of the state.

31 March 2016
Faustin-Archange Touadéra is sworn in as president after winning the second round of the presidential election.

November 2016
Peace agreements signed in Luanda, Angola between certain militias and CAR’s government. Each militia signs a separate agreement.

19 June 2017
Signing of a peace agreement between CAR’s government and thirteen militias, under the aegis of the Sant’Egidio community in Rome.

July 2017
Roadmap for peace adopted in Libreville, Gabon under the aegis of the AU.

January 2018
Moscow delivers weapons and deploys instructors to increase the capacity of CAR’s army. The measure was approved by the UN Sanctions Committee as part of an exemption to the 2013 arms embargo.

August 2018
Under the aegis of Russia and Sudan, four CAR militias sign a declaration of understanding in favour of peace in Khartoum, Sudan. This initiative, competing with the official AU process, causes tension. The signatory groups withdraw from the agreement in October 2018.

February 2019
Signing of a peace agreement between CAR’s government and fourteen militias, under the aegis of the AU and the UN, and with the decisive support of Russia and Sudan.

December 2020
Presidential and legislative elections. Creation of the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement (CPC) by the merger of six militias (four ex-Séléka and two anti-balaka) to disrupt the elections.

January 2021
CPC offensive on Bangui driven back by CAR, Russian and Rwandan forces. These forces then launched a counteroffensive, retaking most of the country’s major cities in the space of a few months.

March 2021
President Touadéra is sworn in for his second term after being re-elected in December 2020.

August 2023
Constitutional referendum leading to the extension of the powers of the executive and the abolition of the two-term presidential limit.

April 2025
CAR’s government signs an agreement with the UPC and 3R militias in N’Djamena, facilitated by Chad, with a view to reintegrating them into the 2019 peace process.

Appendix B: Timeline of Herder-Farmer Conflict in CAR, 2016-2025

This list includes incidents resulting in more than ten deaths in CAR between March 2016 and May 2025. It is based on confidential security reports, UN and NGO reports, and press articles. It does not claim to be exhaustive.

4 July 2016 – Bambari town (Ouaka prefecture)

Two factions of the UPC clashed in Bambari, amid internal power struggles. At least ten people were killed and 25 injured.

4 October 2016 – Bangui, 3rd arrondissement

Self-defence militias in Bangui’s 3rd arrondissement, known as PK5, erected barricades after the death of a CAR army commander. Violence broke out, leaving eleven people dead, including three Fulani.

15 October 2016 – Ngakobo village (Ouaka prefecture)

Former Séléka members affiliated with the UPC attacked a camp for displaced people in Ngakobo, killing eleven people and injuring at least ten others.

21-23 November 2016 – Bria town (Haute-Kotto prefecture)

Clashes between ex-Séléka groups, notably the UPC and the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC), broke out in Bria, killing at least 85 civilians.

21-27 November 2016 – Bocaranga and Koui towns (Ouham-Pendé prefecture)

3R fighters killed at least 50 civilians, raped women and girls, resulting in the displacement of at least 17,000 people.

11-12 December 2016 – Bakala town (Ouaka prefecture)

Clashes between the FPRC and the UPC left at least 30 people dead in Bakala. Some sources put the death toll even higher. The exact number of civilians among the victims remains uncertain.

28 December 2016 – Yambele village (Ouaka prefecture)

The UPC attacked the village of Yambele (south east of Bambari), killing at least ten civilians.

4-7 February 2017 – Ndassima village (Ouaka prefecture)

Fighting between the FPRC-Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) and the UPC in Ndassima left at least twenty people dead.

17 March 2017 – Agoudou-Manga area (Ouaka prefecture)

The FPRC accused the UPC of killing nearly 80 people in the Agoudou-Manga area. The UPC accused the FPRC of burning villages and killing around 45 civilians in retaliation.

20-22 March 2017 – Villages near Bakouma (Mbomou prefecture)

Clashes between anti-balaka and UPC militiamen killed at least twenty people in villages near Bakouma.

21 March 2017 – Yassine town (Ouaka prefecture)

UPC fighters attacked the town of Yassine, where the anti-balaka and FPRC had evacuated the inhabitants of Wadja Wadja and Agoudou-Manga to protect them. They killed at least eighteen civilians, including ten children.

22 March 2017 – Agoudou-Manga area (Ouaka prefecture)

UPC fighters killed at least 50 people and wounded dozens more in the Agoudou-Manga area, notably in Yassenemem, Agoudou-Manga and Nyouyanza.

April 2017 – Bangassou-Rafai road (Mbomou prefecture)

Clashes between anti-balaka and UPC members allied with Fulani herders killed eleven civilians on the Bangassou-Rafai road.

2 May 2017 – Niem-Yelewa town (Nana-Mambéré prefecture)

3R killed twelve people and occupied the town of Niem-Yelewa for twelve days.

8 May 2017 – Alindao town (Basse-Kotto prefecture)

UPC and anti-balaka militiamen clashed in Alindao. In retaliation, the UPC attacked civilians. The local Red Cross counted at least 130 bodies after the fighting.

14-19 May 2017 – Bria town (Haute-Kotto prefecture)

Clashes between the UPC and the FPRC/anti-balaka coalition broke out in Bria, killing nearly 100 people.

28 June-3 July 2017 — Zémio town (Haut-Mbomou prefecture)

The UPC and a local self-defence group clashed in Zémio, killing around 28 people.

3 August 2017 – Gambo town (Mbomou prefecture)

UPC and anti-balaka fighters clashed in Gambo, killing more than 30 people, including civilians.

10 October 2017 – Kembe town (Basse-Kotto prefecture)

A group of anti-balaka fighters attacked Muslim refugees in the Kembe mosque, located between Alindao (controlled by the UPC) and Bangassou (under the control of anti-balaka militias since May 2017). The anti-balaka killed around twenty people.

18 October 2017 – Pombolo village (Mbomou prefecture)

Clashes between anti-balaka fighters and UPC members left at least 26 people dead.

20-23 November 2017 – Dembia village (Mbomou prefecture)

After clashes with anti-balaka fighters, the UPC attacked and looted the village of Dembia, killing around 60 people.

3-7 December 2017 – Ippy town (Ouaka prefecture)

Anti-balaka militiamen and the UPC/FPRC coalition clashed in Ippy, leaving around 53 people dead.

5 January 2018 – Kembe town (Basse-Kotto prefecture)

UPC and anti-balaka fighters clashed near Kembe, leaving around fifteen people dead.

18-20 March 2018 – Alindao town (Basse-Kotto prefecture)

Anti-balaka and UPC fighters clashed in the south of Alindao. MINUSCA intervened to protect civilians. The anti-balaka killed ten UPC fighters.

20 March 2018 – Tagbara village (Ouaka prefecture)

The UPC executed an anti-balaka militiaman in Gotile. In retaliation, the anti-balaka killed fifteen men in the village of Tagbara.

22 March 2018 – Seko village (Ouaka prefecture)

Following the events in Tagbara, members of the UPC and anti-balaka fighters clashed in Seko, killing around ten civilians, including children.

3 April 2018 – Seko village (Ouaka prefecture)

Following the withdrawal of MINUSCA troops from the Saint Charles Lwanga church in Seko, where they had deployed to protect civilians who had taken refuge there, the UPC killed 23 people.

15-17 May 2018 – Bambari town (Ouaka prefecture)

After the murder of three Fulani, UPC militiamen attacked security forces and civilians in Bambari, killing at least 21 people.

18 July 2018 – Pombolo village (Mbomou prefecture)

Anti-balaka members from Bangassou attacked UPC fighters in Pombolo. Seventeen people died in the clash.

2 August 2018 – Lioto village (Ouaka prefecture)

Anti-balaka militiamen and members of the UPC clashed in Lioto, leaving 25 dead.

15 November 2018 – Alindao town (Basse-Kotto prefecture)

Anti-balaka fighters attacked Muslim civilians in Alindao. In retaliation, the UPC attacked the camp for displaced persons in Alindao. Around 112 people were killed.

31 December 2018 – Bakouma town (Mbomou prefecture)

The UPC and FPRC attacked anti-balaka militiamen and members of the national army in Bakouma, killing at least twelve people.

24 January 2019 – Ippy town (Ouaka prefecture)

An intoxicated UPC fighter opened fire on civilians during a funeral in the Djama-Yakania neighbourhood in the town of Ippy. The man killed thirteen civilians and injured around twenty others.

4 April 2019 – Zangba village grouping (Basse-Kotto prefecture)

UPC members attacked several villages in the locality of Zangba, killing almost eighteen people and setting fire to homes.

17-23 April 2019 – Zangba village grouping (Basse-Kotto prefecture)

UPC members and an anti-balaka group clashed for seven days in the villages of the Zangba locality. Dozens of people died, with some sources putting the death toll at over 100.

21 May 2019 – Koundjili, Lemouna and Bohong villages (Ouham Pendé prefecture)

3R fighters killed at least 46 civilians in coordinated attacks in several villages accused of harbouring cattle rustlers. In 2023, the Special Criminal Court convicted those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

27 September 2019 – Bangao and Lioto villages (Ouaka prefecture)

Clashes between anti-balaka militiamen and UPC fighters in Bangao and Lioto left twelve people dead.

9 January 2020 – Alindao town (Basse-Kotto prefecture)

Soldiers from the national army and UPC members clashed in Alindao. The military killed eleven UPC fighters, while the UPC killed three soldiers.

7 December 2020 – Bambari town (Ouaka prefecture)

The army clashed with UPC fighters in Bambari, killing around ten rebels.

29-30 April 2021 – Pavika village (Basse-Kotto prefecture)

UPC fighters attacked the village of Pavika, killing eleven civilians.

15-16 May 2021 – Boyo grouping (Ouaka prefecture)

UPC members affiliated with the CPC clashed with Wagner paramilitaries, killing around twenty people, including civilians.

23 August 2021 – Bossaarou and Sanguere Tourwa villages (Ouham-Pendé prefecture)

Wagner paramilitaries attacked the villages of Bossaarou and Sanguere Tourwa, killing seventeen Fulani herders and six Christian farmers.

6-13 December 2021 – Boyo grouping (Ouaka prefecture)

Wagner paramilitaries and pro-government militias attacked villages in Boyo suspected of harbouring UPC fighters, executing at least twenty people and setting fire to and looting hundreds of houses.

14 January 2022 – Ippy town (Ouaka prefecture)

UPC militiamen affiliated with the CPC ambushed a pro-government anti-balaka group near Ippy, killing around ten people.

2 February 2022 – Komayo village (Ouaka prefecture)

In retaliation for an attack on civilians, UPC members affiliated with the CPC attacked pro-government anti-balaka militiamen in Komayo, killing twelve people.

7 May 2023 – Mboki town (Haut-Mbomou prefecture)

Following the disappearance of a Fulani shepherd, fighters from the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG) group clashed with UPC members affiliated with the CPC in Mboki, killing at least nineteen people.

20 June 2023 – Mboki town (Haut-Mbomou prefecture)

AAKG fighters clashed with UPC members in Mboki, killing at least 40 people.

8 August 2023 – Obo-Mboki road (Haut-Mbomou prefecture)

UPC rebels attacked militiamen from the AAKG group, killing eight people, including six civilians.

8 January 2024 – Kabo town (Ouham prefecture)

UPC fighters affiliated with the CPC clashed with army troops in Kabo. The military killed fifteen rebels, while the UPC killed four soldiers and wounded ten civilians.

28 January 2025 – Nzoroh village (Ouham-Pendé prefecture)

3R fighters attacked the village of Nzoroh, killing nine people and burning down more than 700 houses.

15 February 2025 – Bozoum region (Ouham-Pendé prefecture)

Anti-balaka militiamen from several villages attacked a Fulani herders’ camp, massacring almost 50 civilians, including women, children and the elderly, according to local sources.