The 17 September Jihadist Attack in Bamako: Has Mali’s Security Strategy Failed?
On 17 September, jihadists launched an unprecedented assault on two highly sensitive sites in Bamako, the Malian capital. In this Q&A, Crisis Group expert Jean-Hervé Jézéquel analyses the significance of this event and its implications for the authorities and armed groups.
What happened?
At dawn on 17 September, jihadist fighters simultaneously attacked two highly sensitive sites in Bamako, the Malian capital: the national gendarmerie academy, located in the Faladié neighbourhood, and Modibo Keïta International Airport in Bamako-Sénou, to the south of the city. The two facilities are located around 10km apart, and both are about 30 minutes by car from the city centre. The airport is particularly significant in security terms: not only does it house the Malian military’s main air base, but it is also used by Russian paramilitaries helping the government battle jihadist groups. It was not the first jihadist attack in Bamako: militants hit hotels and bars in the city several times in the period 2015-2017, and in 2022, they raided the garrison town of Kati on Bamako’s outskirts. But it was the first time that jihadists have managed to strike military targets of such importance in the capital.
The Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, JNIM) – an al-Qaeda affiliate that is the main jihadist group active in Mali – quickly claimed responsibility for the double attack in a statement published by Al-Zallaqa, its media arm. Early in the afternoon, with gunfire still ringing out in the capital, JNIM posted several videos to social media platforms. In one, a jihadist is seen setting fire to a Malian government plane parked on the airport tarmac. In another, several fighters are pictured strolling across the airport’s presidential pavilion, seemingly taunting the authorities with their ability to reach this area with such ease. The Malian armed forces did not regain control of the airport until the early afternoon, with air traffic gradually resuming the following day.
JNIM claims that just thirteen fighters carried out the entire operation, but security sources interviewed by Crisis Group put the number slightly higher, at up to twenty. In any case, it was a small band of militants who pulled off the attacks. The Malian military has not said how many assailants there were, perhaps to avoid admitting that they were few in number, but it did say soldiers had neutralised the attackers. At midday, national television broadcast footage of around fifteen suspects it said had been arrested near the gendarmerie academy. But their involvement in the attack is in doubt: unlike the jihadists who appear in JNIM’s videos, none of these individuals was wearing fatigues.
The death toll is unclear. International media reports put it at 50-70 (with some saying it is higher still).
The death toll is unclear. International media reports put it at 50-70 (with some saying it is higher still). These figures differ from those announced by the two sides, which tend, respectively, to exaggerate and downplay the number of casualties in the clashes between them. JNIM claims that “hundreds of enemy soldiers have been killed or wounded”, though the al-Qaeda branch has not released any evidence to back up this assertion. It is also unclear if any Russian paramilitaries were killed, as JNIM also claims. For its part, the Malian general staff acknowledged only “some loss of life on the friendly side ... including some gendarmerie cadets” in a press release.
The material toll is uncertain as well. JNIM claims to have destroyed several aircraft, including a drone and six warplanes. The authorities deny it, conceding only that damage was done to “some installations” and equipment at the two locations. The images circulating on social media so far show only civilian vehicles damaged, including the Malian government plane and another belonging to the World Food Programme.
Are these attacks a defeat for Bamako?
These two attacks are undoubtedly a major blow to the military, which has been pursuing an iron-fist counter-insurgency strategy since seizing power in the 2020 coup (and taking over a second time in 2021). The assault’s scale and duration – it went on for almost nine hours – pointed not just to intelligence failures but also to vulnerabilities in the government’s defences. In a sign of unease in high places, no Malian politician made a statement on the evening of the attack or the day after.
The date JNIM chose for the operation is also highly symbolic. Its fighters struck five days before Mali celebrates its independence on 22 September, on two other anniversaries: the one-year marker for the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) – which brings together the three military regimes of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso – and the 64-year marker for the national gendarmerie. In anticipation of these events, the authorities had stepped up security in Bamako in recent weeks. Rumours of a pending attack in the city, and in the other AES capitals, had been circulating in Sahelian military circles. JNIM staged its assault despite this state of alert, highlighting the failings of the Malian security apparatus.
The double attack does not negate everything the Malian army has done of late to improve security, but it does call into question the transitional authorities’ choice to try subduing the jihadist groups by force alone. They have dismantled the international stabilisation system centred on France’s Operation Barkhane and MINUSMA, the UN mission that withdrew in 2023 at the government’s request. Instead, the Bamako authorities have made Russia a privileged security partner and put the Malian armed forces back on the front line. The army subsequently deployed to parts of the country’s centre and north where previously it had been absent, notably taking over Kidal in November 2023. Before the army moved in, this northern town was the stronghold of former rebels who had fought the state from 2012 to 2015. The sides had concluded peace agreement in Algiers, thanks to mediation led by the Algerian government, but the ex-rebels neither disarmed nor completely demobilised.
Yet, as covered by Crisis Group in a February report , taking over Kidal did not bolster the Malian army’s power. On the contrary, it spelled doom for the 2015 Algiers agreement, triggering fresh clashes between the state and the signatory armed groups, which are distinct from the jihadist organisations in conflict with Bamako. Fighting between the government and its various adversaries, whether jihadists or the northern armed groups, who have revived their struggle, now extends along a “front” stretching more than 2,000km from Kidal in the north to the Kayes region in the south west. Government troops are spread thin, risking exhaustion.
The jihadist groups have thus come out on top in the renewed conflict between the state and the separatist groups in the north. The Bamako attacks are a reminder to the authorities that their military strength is limited, and that by opening new fronts, they have left themselves exposed. Meanwhile, JNIM has scored a propaganda victory, proving its ability to inflict pain on the military in the capital itself.
Do the attacks mark a turning point in jihadist strategy?
Like its rival IS-Sahel, the regional branch of the Islamic State, JNIM has extended its sway over large areas of rural Mali, but so far refrained from trying to take over urban centres. In 2012, when the northern crisis broke out, the jihadists controlled the major towns there for a few months. But their concentration in urban areas exposed them to the strikes of Operation Serval, the French mission that went to Mali in January 2013 (and was the precursor of Operation Barkhane). Since then, rather than occupy towns, the jihadists have preferred to put pressure on government forces there with blockades or, less commonly, hit-and-run attacks.
The scale of the 17 September operation shows that JNIM now has the capability not only to strike at secondary cities, but also to engage Malian forces in Bamako. Emboldened by this success, JNIM could decide to put the capital under partial siege by staging regular attacks or by disrupting its supply lines, which run through the countryside where the jihadists are strongest. JNIM would then be able to exert unprecedented pressure on the regime. In such a scenario, JNIM’s objective might very well be to seize the capital itself.
JNIM also faces major challenges, however. French forces eliminated several of its influential leaders in the north; the Malian army and its Russian allies have taken out still more of them. Replacing these leaders has sown a great deal of internal tension. Certain katiba (brigade) commanders may seek to grab overall control, even at the risk of causing splits in JNIM’s ranks. In central Mali, the group is strong, but it has come under heavy military pressure as the army has intensified its operations over the last three years. If JNIM is seeking to move into the south, where Bamako sits, it may be precisely to draw the army out of the militants’ rural strongholds.
How should the Malian authorities react in the coming weeks?
In the immediate aftermath of the 17 September attack, the authorities sought to assuage the anger among Bamako’s population. That day, crowds lynched several people suspected of being jihadists or jihadist sympathisers in neighbourhoods close to the airport and gendarmerie academy. These people were probably targeted because they were Fulani, the ethnic group from central Mali that many citizens perceive as close to the jihadists. In the afternoon, the army chief of staff appeared on television to call for calm, asking the public to share any information about the attack with the security forces rather than indulge in mob justice, which he said plays into the jihadists’ hands.
The government is also concerned to preserve its credibility as guarantor of the country’s security, a point on which it has always claimed to have a better record than its predecessors. For the time being, most Bamako residents interviewed by Crisis Group are downplaying the attack and seem to be rallying behind the authorities. But the people of Bamako are facing serious material difficulties, as the economy has been flagging since the 2020 coup. Another serious attack could undermine confidence in the regime and its ability to ensure public safety. The authorities are therefore keen to avoid another incident. They will undoubtedly be particularly vigilant in Bamako in the days and weeks to come.
At present, it would be risky for the regime to bet on military success alone to burnish its image.
In the short term, it is likely that the armed forces will order high-profile strikes on the jihadists using their fleet of drones. The authorities may also move faster to launch an operation to recapture Tinzawaten, a locale on the Algerian border where the army and Russian paramilitaries suffered an unprecedented defeat at the hands of separatists and, to a lesser extent, JNIM on 27 July. But at present, it would be risky for the regime to bet on military success alone to burnish its image. Another setback could further weaken the regime and put the coherence of its inner circles to the test. Some in its ranks might try to oust rivals by blaming them for the security lapses in Bamako and elsewhere.
The 17 September attack calls for a broader response than new military operations and the “bunkerisation” of the capital. It demonstrates the need to overhaul the counter-insurgency strategy that has been in place since 2021. The imperative for the Malian authorities is not to abandon their partnership with Russia and renew the old alliance with France, which did not work either. Rather, it is to invest more in the avenues identified by the inter-Malian dialogue, launched by the authorities in March to find solutions to the country’s crisis. In particular, the authorities should consider adopting an ambitious policy of dialogue with all the country’s political and armed groups, including those jihadists who are willing. Military action will always remain essential, but it should be anchored in a political strategy aimed at finding acceptable compromises among the belligerents. If used skilfully, dialogue would by no means be a form of surrender.
The authorities should also make sure to broaden the coalition of Malian and regional forces that support such a course of action. They should reach out to Mali’s political class, which has been largely sidelined since the coup. They should do the same with Mali’s neighbours, particularly those belonging to the Economic Community of West African States, the bloc on which they abruptly turned their backs in January, some months after forming AES. They should also seek to mend fences with the signatory groups of the Algiers agreement, which have been too quickly dismissed as enemies though their interests differ from those of the jihadists. Faced with a jihadist threat that has just shown a stronger capacity to destabilise Mali, Bamako will need to harness the energies of as many people as possible.